PRELIMINARY REPORT

ON

ACCIDENT TO M/S VSR VENTURES PVT. LTD. LEARJET 45XR AIRCRAFT BEARING REGISTRATION VT-SSK AT BARAMATI ON 28 JANUARY 2026

Government of India

Ministry of Civil Aviation

Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau

FOREWORD

This document has been prepared based on the preliminary factual information and evidences collected during the initial stages of investigation. The information is preliminary and subject to change. Hence, unless and otherwise specified, no conclusion shall be drawn from the information provided in the document.

In accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Rule 3 of Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents), Rules 2025, the sole objective of the investigation of an Accident/Incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents and not to apportion blame or liability. The investigation conducted in accordance with the provisions of the above said rules shall be separate from any judicial or administrative proceedings to apportion blame or liability.

Consequently, the use of this report for any purpose other than for the prevention of future accidents or incidents could lead to erroneous interpretations.

TABLE OF CONTENT

1. General Information

1.	Aircraft	Type	Learjet 45 XR
		Nationality	Indian
		Registration	VT-SSK
2.	Owner and Operator		M/s VSR Ventures Pvt. Ltd.
3.	Pilot		ATPL Holder
	Extent of Injuries		Fatal
4.	Co Pilot		CPL Holder
	Extent of Injuries		Fatal
5.	No. of Persons on board		Total 05: 02 cockpit crew, 01 cabin attendant and 02 passengers
6.	Extent of Injuries		Fatal
6.	Date & Time of Accident		28 January 2026, approximately 0316 UTC (0846 IST) *
7.	Place of Accident		Baramati
8.	Co-ordinates of Accident Site		18°13'56.93" N 074°34'26.14" E
9.	Last point of Departure		Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj International Airport (CSMIA), Mumbai
10.	Intended landing place		Baramati Airport
11.	Type of Operation		Non-Scheduled Passenger
12.	Phase of operation		Landing

* Time as per Flight Data Recorder.

2. Notification and Initial Response

On 28th January 2026, Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) received a notification from Operational Control Room, Airports Authority of India (AAI) regarding the accident involving Learjet 45 XR aircraft bearing registration VT-SSK belonging to M/s VSR Ventures Pvt. Ltd at Baramati. It was notified that the aircraft VT-SSK was operating a non-scheduled flight from Mumbai to Baramati and crash landed at about 0846 Hrs IST while landing at Baramati.

On receipt of the notification, a team of three officers from AAIB and Director General, AAIB reached the accident site at Baramati on the same day. A team of three officers from Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) also arrived on the same day from Mumbai. The AAIB team carried out on-site activities and evidence collection under the guidance of DG, AAIB.

As per the requirement of ICAO Annex 13 and the Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents & Incidents) Rules, 2025, the Initial notification of the accident was sent to State of Design & Manufacture which in this case is National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), USA. NTSB, USA appointed an Accredited Representative and Technical Advisers from Bombardier, Honeywell and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to assist in this Investigation.

An investigation has been ordered by DG, AAIB in exercise of power conferred to him by the Rule 11 (1) of the Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules 2025. The investigation team is taking assistance of relevant subject matter experts like qualified pilots, Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (AME), Air Traffic Controller, Aviation Medicine Specialists to assist in the investigation.

3. Aircraft Information

Aircraft Model	Learjet 45XR
Aircraft S. No.	417
Year of Manufacturer	2010
Name of Owner	VSR Ventures Pvt. Ltd.
C of R (Certificate of Registration)	5333/3 Issued on 27/12/2022
C of A (Certificate of Airworthiness)	7453 Issued on 16/09/2021
Category	Normal Passenger
C of A Validity	Valid subject to validity of ARC
ARC (Airworthiness Review Certificate) issued on	10/09/2025
ARC valid up to	14/09/2026
Aircraft Empty Weight	6288.47 Kgs
Maximum Take-off Weight	9752 Kgs
Date of Aircraft weighment	21/05/2021
Max Usable Fuel	2749 Kgs
Total Aircraft Hours	4915:48 Hrs
Last Major Inspection	4800 Hrs inspection, done at; 4776:17 Hrs/ 5714 cycles, Dated: 23/03/2025
Engine Type	HONEYWELL TFE 731-20BR-1B
Engine Sl. No. (LH)	P-132202C
Last Inspection (LH)	Engine Control Trend Monitoring (ECTM) at 4860:36 Hrs on 05/11/2025
Total Engine Hours/ Cycles (LH)	4915:48 Hrs/ 5965 cycles
Engine Sl. No. (RH)	P-132201C
Last Inspection (RH)	Engine Control Trend Monitoring (ECTM) at 4471:32 Hrs on 05/11/2025
Total Engine Hours/ Cycles (RH)	4526:44 Hrs /5426 cycles
Aeromobile License	Valid Till 15/08/2027
Aircraft flying under MEL (Minimum Equipment List) invoked (till the date of accident)	NIL

As per the statement of technician who was tasked for departure of the aircraft on 28 January 2026, the current technical log book was carried on board.

Following is the history of induction process of the aircraft by the operator: -

S. No.	Details	Remarks
1.	C of A issued on (When the Aircraft was with previous owner i.e. Travian Flight Services Pvt. Ltd.)	16/09/2021
2.	Approved weight Schedule (When the Aircraft was with previous owner)	Issued in June 2021
3.	Local Acquisition Permission Issued by DGCA for VSR to induct this Aircraft on lease	12/08/2022
4.	01st C of R issued in the name of VSR as operator & owner as Travian Flight Services Pvt. Ltd.	23/08/2022
5.	Short term Aeromobile License issued on	06/09/2022

6.	Aircraft endorsed on VSR NSOP	11/11/2022
7.	C of R issued by DGCA with VSR as owner and operator	27/12/2022
8.	Regular Aeromobile license issued on	05/12/2022

4. Personnel information

4.1 Pilot-In-Command (PIC)

Age	61 Years
Date of Birth	30-04-1964
Date of joining company	30-12-2020
License	Airline Transport Pilot License (ATPL) holder
Date if Issue	01-05-2006
Valid up to	30-04-2026
License Category	Aeroplane
Date of Class I Medical Exam	19-11-2025
Class I Medical valid up to	19-05-2026
Date of issue of Flight Radio Telephony Operator License (FRTOL)	01-05-2002
FRTOL valid up to	30-04-2027
Date of issue Radio Telephone Operator's Restricted (RTR) License	17-01-2011
RTR License valid up to	16-01-2031
Total flying experience	18855 Hrs
Total flying experience on type	2815:16 Hrs
Total flying experience on type as PIC	2792:21 Hrs
Last flown on type	26-01-2026
Total flying experience during last 1 year	631:40 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 6 Months	365:00 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 90 Days	204:20 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 30 Days	46:45 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 07 Days	12:35 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 24 Hours	Nil
Rest period before flight	34:00 Hours
Date of Latest Flight Checks	Instrument Rating (IR) Check: 18-08-2025 Pilot Proficiency Check (PPC): 18-08-2025

4.2 First Officer (FO)

Age	25 Years
Date of Birth	09-08-2000
Date of joining company	06-09-2022
License	Commercial Pilot License (CPL) holder
Date if issue	29-05-2020
Valid up to	28-05-2035
License Category	Aeroplane
Date of Class I Medical Exam	12-07-2025
Class I Medical valid up to	24-07-2026
Date of issue FRTOL	31-01-2020
FRTOL valid up to	01-12-2039
Date of issue RTR License	09-12-2019

RTR License valid up to	01-12-2039
Endorsement as Copilot	23-08-2022
Total flying experience	2490:58 Hrs
Total flying experience on type (as FO)	2243:58 Hrs
Last flown on type	17-01-2026
Total flying experience during last 1 year	552:25 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 6 Months	291:25 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 90 Days	123:05 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 30 Days	01:35 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 07 Days	Nil
Total flying experience during last 24 Hours	Nil
Rest period before flight	09 Days 15 Hrs
Date of Latest Flight Checks	PPC: - 17-01-2026 Ground Class: - 02-06-2025 IR Check: - 06-06-2025

4.3 Experience of operating into Uncontrolled Airfield and VIP flights

Both the pilots have flown to Baramati earlier and were aware of the topography of the airfield. As per the records available with the company, the PIC and FO had prior experience of operating number of VIP flights and other flights to uncontrolled airfield (Including Baramati).

5. Aerodrome Information

5.1 Baramati Airfield

The Baramati Airfield is situated in the Baramati District of the State Maharashtra. The airfield is an uncontrolled airfield which is managed and maintained by the Aerodrome Operator i.e. M/s Maharashtra Airport Development Company Limited (MADC). The airfield is primarily used for flying training operations with two flying training organisations (FTOs) having their base at Baramati i.e. M/s Carver Aviation Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Redbird Flying Training Academy Pvt. Ltd. However, Non-scheduled operations (especially Chartered/VIP flights) are also being carried out at Baramati regularly.

There are two temporary ATC towers each being operated and maintained by respective organisations. The ATC is being handled by the respective Students/Instructors of the FTOs with hand held RT which again is primarily used for assisting the flying training operations. However, the Non-Scheduled/chartered flights including VIP flights are also handled by either of the two towers manned by their instructors/students only.

The aerodrome has one runway (RWY) with following specification:

The runway orientation is 11/29. The runway length is 7710 ft and the threshold has been displaced by 1400 ft for RWY11 and 500 ft for RWY 29.

5.2 Inspection of Aerodrome during the investigation

The investigation team inspected the aerodrome during the onsite investigation and following was revealed: -

- The airport is an uncontrolled airfield and does not have any navigational aids other than wind socks. Two windsocks have been installed at the aerodrome, both towards RWY 29 side. No wind sock was available towards runway 11 side.

- Only Visual Flight Rules (VFR) operations can be carried out. However, regular flying training operations and Non-scheduled operations are carried out in the airport.
- One end of the runway (beginning of RWY 11) is table top.
- MADC is the present aerodrome operator since August 2025.
- Baramati airport does not have an inhouse ARFF (Aircraft Rescue & Fire Fighting) unit, hence, based on request from non-scheduled operators/ charter flights, Ambulance and firefighting service are provided by Baramati Municipal Corporation on the request made by the aerodrome operator.
- The last runway re-carpeting was carried out in March 2016 and thereafter no runway re-carpeting was carried out which resulted into fading of all the runway markings and presence of loose gravels on the runway surface.

Figure 1: Faded Runway Markings at Runway-11 end.

- There is no boundary wall around the aerodrome. The available fencing is not adequate and does not cover the entire aerodrome.

6. Weather Information

6.1 Meteorological (MET) Information

There is no MET facility available at Baramati Airfield. The weather information such as winds, temperature, QNH is generally passed on to the aircraft with the help of a weather instrument installed in the temporary tower of M/s Carver Aviation. There are two wind socks installed in the aerodrome towards runway 29 side. The visibility information is issued to the aircraft based on the visibility chart prepared by the flying training organizations having identified different visibility markers (such as permanent structures) at various locations around the airfield for flying training operations. The visibility chart used by the organisation is shown in figure 2 below.



Figure 2: Chart of Visibility markers used at Baramati

On the day of accident, the tower was manned by a ground instructor of one of the FTO who was communicating with the aircraft to assist the landing. The crew of VT-SSK asked for visibility while approaching Baramati for which the tower replied as 3000 meters by looking at the visibility markers. Further, while giving the landing clearance, the tower informed winds as calm. Hence, the visibility reported at Baramati at the time of landing of aircraft was well below the minima required for VFR flight which is 5000 meters (5 Km).

6.2 MET information of Pune (VAPO) and Mumbai (VABB)

The MET information for VAPO and VABB (both are controlled airfields) on the day of accident between 0200 (0730 IST) to 0330 UTC (0900 IST) is given below:

Mumbai: VABB

Time (UTC)	Wind (^{O}/Kts)	Visibility	Weather	Cloud	Temperature/ Dew Point	Trend
0200	030/07 KT	2500 M	HZ (Haze)	NSC	22.4°C / 13.6°C	NOSIG
0230	060/06 KT	2500 M	FU (Smoke)	NSC	22.4°C / 13.1°C	NOSIG
0300	010/05KT	2500 M	FU	NSC	22.6°C / 13°C	NOSIG
0330	040/05 KT	2500 M	FU	FEW100	23.5°C / 13°C	BECMG 3000 FU

Pune: VAPO

Time (UTC)	Wind (^{O}/Kts)	Visibility	Weather	Cloud	Temperature/ Dew Point	Trend
0200	VRB/01 KT	2500 M	BR (Mist)	FEW100	18°C / 15°C	TEMPO 2000 BR
0230	VRB/01 KT	2500 M	BR	FEW100	19°C / 16°C	TEMPO 2000
0240	VRB/01 KT	2000 M	BR	FEW100	19°C / 16°C	NOSIG
0300	050/04 KT	2000 M	BR	SKC	20°C / 16°C	NOSIG
0330	050/03 KT	2200 M	BR	SKC	20°C / 16°C	BECMG 3000

The METAR of Pune is showing lowest visibility of 2000 m from 0240 UTC (0810 IST) to 0300 UTC (0830 IST) with clear skies.

SATELLITE IMAGERY (VAPO – Pune)

As per INSAT-3DR colour composite of 28 January 2026 between 0315 to 0342 UTC (see figure 3 below), no significant clouding is seen over in and around Pune. However, over Baramati which is in a radial of 120 degree and 81 Km from Pune airfield, presence of very shallow Fog in patches can be inferred.



Figure 3: INSAT-3DR snapshot of 28 January 2026 between 0315 to 0342 UTC

7. Wreckage and Impact Information

The aircraft was attempting to land on runway 11 after obtaining landing clearance by Baramati tower. The aircraft, however, crash landed on the left of the runway abeam threshold of runway 11. As per the CCTV footages installed in nearby village, the aircraft was observed to have banked towards right before impacting the terrain. The aircraft first impacted the trees before hitting the ground which is at a lower elevation than the runway surface. The ground impact of aircraft was at a lateral distance of about 50 meters on the left from edge of RWY 11. The aircraft was engulfed in fire during which the entire cockpit and cabin section got burnt. The aircraft was destroyed during the accident. The wreckage distribution chart at the accident site is given in figure 4 below.



Figure 4: Wreckage distribution chart (Not to scale)
(Distances in feet with empennage as reference)

A. 309' Part of RH flap
B. 307' RH Landing Gear
C. 241' Servo Landing Gear Control Valve Landing Gear Bay
D. 219' Part of Lower Mid fuselage
E. 197' Part of the RH flap
F. 140' LH Engine
G. 132' Wings Skin Part
H. 115' LH Landing Gear Door
I. 100' First Point of Impact
J. 92' LH Eng Cowl inlet and thrust reversal
K. 91' LH Landing Gear
L. 90' RHS Wing Tip
M. 87' Spoiler & ENG Mount
N. 82' LH Eng Cowl
O. 81' L/G Door Unlock Actuator
P. 76' RH Servo Tab and Wing
Q. 69' Wings Skin Part
R. 65' RH Wing Parts
S. 55' LH Wing route
T. 28' Fuselage wreckage
U. 25' Cockpit Wreckage
V. 25' Emergency Door
W. 24' Windshield
X. 24' Part of Leading Edge
Y. 20' Nose Landing Gear
Z. 10' Debris of cowling

The tail portion (Empennage) was the major airframe part which was recovered from the site and was located near the final impact point of the aircraft with ground. The pictures of some major identifiable parts of the aircraft at the accident site is provided in Annexure A of the report.

8. Flight Recorders

Both the flight recorders i.e. Solid-State Flight Data Recorders (SSFDR) and Solid-State Cockpit Voice Recorder (SSCVR) were found in their original location i.e. at the tail portion of the aircraft wreckage. Both the recorders were removed from the wreckage and were quarantined for data recovery and further analysis.

The details of the flight recorders installed in the aircraft are as follows: -

- SSFDR
  Make: L3 Communication

Part Number: 2100-2042-00
Serial Number: 000564229
This FDR was factory fitted by Bombardier dated 16 December 2010. As per the component maintenance manual of L3, the SSFDR unit having part number 2100-2042-00 (as in this case) can record upto 25 hours of data.

- SSCVR
Make: Honeywell
Part Number: 980-6022-011
Serial Number: 0939
This CVR was installed on 03 May 2021. As per the component maintenance manual of Honeywell, the CVR unit having part number 980-6022-011 (as in this case) records 02 hours of data.

Both SSFDR and SSCVR were subjected to thermal damage as both the recorders were exposed to high temperatures during the accident, hence, special recovery and analysis technique was required for this case.
The download from the SSFDR was attempted at the AAIB flight recorders lab in New Delhi and the raw data has been successfully downloaded from the unit.

The SSCVR which is an independent unit was also subjected to thermal damage. However, the manufacturer of SSCVR is different i.e. Honeywell, for which the required resources and technical expertise to download the data from such thermally damaged SSCVR is available with the state of manufacturer/design which can best serve the investigation. Hence, necessary assistance is sought from the state of manufacturer/design as per the relevant Standards and Recommended practices of ICAO Annex 13 to download the data from the SSCVR.

9. Medical & Pathological Information

9.1 Pre-flight Breath Analyzer (BA) Test

On 28 January 2026, the pre-flight B.A of both the pilots were carried out by the paramedic inside the aircraft at 071132 Hrs and 071623 Hrs IST respectively (Timings as per B.A slip). The control test was recorded by the paramedic at 071012 Hrs IST. As per practice, the procedure was recorded on the mobile phone of the paramedic and the video along with B.A slips were forwarded to operations department on WhatsApp.
As per the video clip and the B.A slip shared by the operator, the pre-flight B.A tests for both the pilots were found to be negative (Satisfactory).

9.2 Post-Mortem Report

All the person on board including the flight crew could not survive the accident. The bodies of both the flight crew were subjected to post-mortem examination at P.A.H Govt. Medical College, Baramati. As per the report, the cause of death for both the flight crew was stated as

"Death due to multiple injuries associated with Burn injuries (Unnatural)"

10. Sequence of Events

10.1 Last flight operated on VT-SSK before the accident flight

On 26 January 2026, the aircraft VT-SSK had operated a charter flight for sector Mumbai – Surat – Mumbai. The flight landed back at Mumbai late night at about 0020 Hrs IST on 27 January 2026. The operating crew of that flight stated that they did not find any abnormality in the aircraft during the entire flight and the flight on that day was uneventful. The technician who was available for arrival of the aircraft at Mumbai stated that no abnormality was observed in the aircraft during the post flight inspection carried out.

10.2 Flight planning

On 27 January 2026 at around 1930 Hrs IST, the operator received the requirement for arranging a charter flight (VIP) for the travel of late Hon'ble Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra from Mumbai to Baramati for 28 January 2026 at 0730 Hrs IST. After getting the confirmation of the flight, on 27 January 2026 at 2111 hrs IST, the operator had sent an e-mail to aerodrome operator at Baramati for intimation and seeking landing permission. The aerodrome operator through return e-mail on 27 January 2026 at 2115 hrs IST gave permission to operate at Baramati Aerodrome (i.e. VFR operations only).

The details of flight plan (FPL) filed by the operator at Mumbai are as follows: -

Date & Time of filing	At 2040 UTC on 27 January 2026 i.e. 0210 Hrs IST on 28 January 2026.
Aircraft Registration	VT-SSK
Sector	VABB to ZZZZ (Co-ordinates 1813 N, 07435 E)
Route	W28-LUKTI-DCT
Alternate	1st Alternate: VAPO (Pune) and 2nd Alternate: VABB (Mumbai)
ETD (Estimated Time of Departure) from Mumbai	0145 UTC i.e. 0715 Hrs IST.
PIC	First Name of the PIC who operated the accident flight was mentioned.
Date & time for filing change in FPL.	At 2233 UTC on 27 January 2026 i.e. 0403 Hrs IST on 28 January 2026.
Changes in FPL observed	Only Flight Information Centre (FIC) number was updated. Air Defence Clearance (ADC) number was mentioned as not applicable.

10.3 Departure and enroute flight

After arrival of the aircraft on 27 January 2026, the aircraft was parked in a bay at old terminal side and outside a hangar. As per the statement of the technician who was tasked for departure of the aircraft reported for duty at around 0530 Hrs IST on 28 January 2026. As per the statement of the technician, the onboard fuel was 2900 Lbs and about 2100 Lbs of fuel was uplifted to make it 5000 lbs of fuel in total for the flight.

As per the Load & trim sheet made available to the investigation team the take-off weight of the aircraft was calculated as 19603 Lbs. As per the approved weight schedule of the aircraft, the maximum take-off weight of the aircraft was 21500 Lbs and the maximum usable fuel quantity is given as 6062 Lbs.

The crew along with the cabin attendant arrived at the aircraft at around 0709 IST. The crew carried out the walk around inspection of the aircraft at around 0710 IST and 0721 IST respectively. One passenger arrived at 0738 IST and the VIP arrived at 0759 IST. After the passengers boarded the aircraft, the technician closed the cargo door and main door of the aircraft at 0800 IST. After obtaining necessary clearances from ATC, Mumbai, for pull forward and start up, the aircraft started pull forward at around 0801 IST. The timings in this para were mentioned as per the timings of CCTV footages installed at nearby hangar.

The aircraft was given take-off clearance from runway 27 at around 080951 IST and subsequently the aircraft took-off from Mumbai for Baramati. The aircraft was then given climb to flight level (FL) 190. The aircraft was then changed over to Pune after aircraft confirmed Mumbai about establishing positive contact with ATC, Pune.

The aircraft came in contact with ATC, Pune on frequency 118.8 Mhz at about 081616 Hrs IST while it was climbing to the assigned flight level of 190. At 082646 Hrs IST, the aircraft informed ATC, Pune that they are 38 miles to Baramati. Thereafter, ATC, Pune gave further descent to 6000 feet and asked to report if they are in contact with Baramati. The aircraft informed that they are in VHF contact with Baramati. Thereafter, the changeover was approved by ATC, Pune and the aircraft came in contact with Baramati tower.

10.4 Approach to Baramati, go-around and the accident

The timings mentioned in this section are based on the timings provided by the Baramati tower which were taken from the timings of CCTV cameras installed at tower which records both audio and video.

Initially, the aircraft came in contact with Baramati tower at about 081925 hrs IST. At 082727 IST, the aircraft informed Baramati tower that it is now released by Pune and handed over to Baramati. The aircraft further informed that they are descending from FL100 for 6000 feet. The salient communication between Baramati tower and the aircraft VT-SSK from the first contact till the time of accident is as follows: -

FIRST APPROACH AND GO-AROUND		
TIME (IST) HH: MM: SS	**AIRCRAFT**	**BARAMATI: ATC**
08:19:25	BARAMATI TOWER VT-SSK	--
08:19:30	--	VT-SSK BARAMATI TOWER
08:19:34	MUMBAI TO YOU FL190, SQUAWK 3307, ESTIMATED ARRIVAL AT 03:03	--
08:19:41	--	VT-SSK MONITORED CALL WHEN RELEASED BY PUNE
08:19:45	ROGER VSSK	--
08:27:27	BARAMATI TOWER VT-SSK RELEASED BY PUNE ON HAND OVER WITH YOU DESCENDING FL100 FOR 6000	--
08:27:33	-	VT-SSK KINDLY DISTANCE INBOUND BARAMATI
08:27:36	SAY AGAIN	--
08:27:38	--	DISTANCE INBOUND BARAMATI
08:27:39	30 MILES VSK	--

08:27:41	--	NEXT CALL 10 MILES INBOUND ON FINAL APPROACH COURSE FOR RUNWAY 11 LOCAL QNH IS 1020
08:27:47	QNH 1020 AND CONFIRM RWY 11 IN USE?	--
08:27:49	--	AFFIRM MA'AM WINDS CALM FOR RUNWAY 11
08:27:53	REQUESTING RUNWAY 29 VSK	--
08:27:54	--	ROGER RUNWAY 29 APPROVED, CALL ON FINAL APPROACH COURSE RUNWAY 29, COURSE WILL BE 287
08:28:00	287 COPIED VSK	--
08:28:08	REQUESTING FURTHER DESCEND FOR VM VSK	--
08:28:11	--	VSK YOU CAN DESCEND IN VMC AT PILOT DESCRETION
08:28:15	COPIED VSK	--
08:29:57	REQUESTING RUNWAY 11 ONLY FOR USE VSK	--
08:30:00	--	ROGER MA'AM, RUNWAY 11 IS APPROVED, KINDLY CALL FINAL APPROACH COARSE 10 MILES
08:30:04	COPIED VSK	--
08:31:10	REQUESTING CURRENT VISIBILITY VSK	--
08:31:13	--	VISIBILITY IS 3KM AS OF NOW
08:34:25	FINAL APPROACH COURSE VSK	--
08:34:28	--	VSK CONFIRM FIELD IN SIGHT
08:34:34	VISUAL WITH TERRAIN WILL CALL WHEN FIELD IN SIGHT	--
08:34:35	--	ROGER
08:36:36	GOING AROUND VSK WILL JOIN LEFT BASE FOR RUNWAY 2	--
08:36:41	--	VSK VISUAL WITH YOU, CALL LEFT ABEAM

SECOND APPROACH AND THE ACCIDENT

TIME (IST) HH: MM: SS	AIRCRAFT	BARAMATI: ATC
08:40:21	REQUEST FINAL APPROACH COURSE FOR RUNWAY 11	--
08:40:25	--	ROGER MAM, APPROVED CALL FINALS FOR RUNWAY 11
08:40:27	MAM, REQUESTING FINAL APPROACH COURSE CONFIRM ONE ONE ZERO	--
08:40:30	--	NEGATIVE MAM 107
08:40:32	107 VSK	--
08:43:15	--	VT-SSK CHECK POSITION
08:43:20	FINAL APPROACH COURSE VSK	--
08:43:22	--	COPIED
08:43:24	--	CONFIRM RUNWAY IN SIGHT
08:43:27	CALL YOU RUNWAY IN SIGHT VSK	--
08:43:28	--	COPIED
08:43:55	FIELD IN SIGHT VSK	--

08:43:59	--	VSK WINDS CALM RUNWAY 11 CLEARED TO LAND
08:44:13	OH S**T OH S**T…	--

The controller informs visibility as 3 Kms. However, the aircraft continued approach and subsequently carried out go-around. During the second approach the aircraft reported field in sight and subsequently landing clearance was given by the Baramati tower for runway 11. The tower also informed the winds as calm. Later the aircraft was heard transmitting “Oh S**t… Oh S**t…”, before it crash landed on the left side of the runway abeam runway 11 threshold.

The probable flight path followed by the aircraft after the go-around was initiated is depicted below.

Figure 5a: The probable flight path for first approach and intitation of Go-Around

Figure 5b: Probable Flight path of the Aircraft after initiating go-around till accident.

The figure 5a & 5b above is the probable flight path followed by the aircraft after initiating go-around till the time of accident as per the preliminary DFDR data analysis.

11. Progress of the Investigation

i. The data from SSFDR has been downloaded and the data is being analysed.

ii. The data from SSCVR will be downloaded with the assistance of National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) as per the Standards & Recommended practices of ICAO Annex 13.

iii. Initial statements of the operator personnel and other relevant individual have been collected and is being scrutinized with other available evidence.

iv. The evidence collected are being analysed for further course of action.

v. The aircraft wreckage has been shifted to a secured space for further detailed examination.

vi. Onsite wreckage examination was carried out, and the findings have been recorded for further analysis.

vii. The documents pertaining to airworthiness, operations, flight safety and aircraft related have been seized for further scrutiny and analysis.

viii. The NTSB, USA has appointed Accredited Representative along with technical advisers to participate and assist in the investigation as per ICAO Annex 13 requirements.

ix. Records/information obtained from other stakeholders are currently being scrutinized.

x. All the aspects of the accident will be examined and investigated to bring out the facts, root cause(s) and contributory factor(s) leading to the accident.

12. Interim Safety Recommendation

In view of the interim findings brought out so far, it is considered necessary to issue following interim safety recommendations so that necessary preventive actions can be taken promptly to enhance aviation safety.

12.1 Based on the findings made at Para 6.1 and para 10.4 of this report:

a. It is recommended that DGCA may issue necessary directions to all operators operating VFR flights to uncontrolled airfields to strictly adhere to the laid down standard operating procedures. Further, necessary directions may also be issued to all the aerodrome operators/organizations responsible for handling the aerodrome services at the uncontrolled airfields to ensure that the flying operations (including Non-scheduled/Private/Charter operations) in the airfield is allowed only when the prevailing MET conditions are within the criteria laid down in the relevant DGCA regulations.

12.2 Based on the findings made at para 5.2 of this report and with increase in number of Non-Scheduled/Private operations in the uncontrolled airfields:

a. It is recommended that, DGCA may issue specific directions to all the stakeholders responsible to manage and maintain the uncontrolled airfields to ensure that required safety standards are maintained at the airport for safe aircraft operations. Compliance of the same may be checked during audit/surveillance.

b. It is recommended that DGCA may take necessary measures to enhance the landing aids along with basic MET facility at these airports to cater for large number of Non-Scheduled/chartered flying (including VIP flights) being carried out at these airports apart from flying training activities.

c. It is recommended that DGCA may check the feasibility of licensing these aerodromes for conduct of safe and regulated flying operations.

Note: - AAIB may issue interim safety recommendations at any stage of the investigation whenever it considers that necessary preventive measures are required to be taken promptly to enhance aviation safety.

Annexure "A"

RH Engine and Empennage	RH Servo Tab and Wing
	
Cockpit Wreckage	**RHS Landing Gear and Airframe Fuel Filter Towards Left**
	

Part of Lower Mid fuselage

RH Wing along with Landing Gear Bay area, Airframe Fuel Filter and flap mount attachment

Part of RH Flap

Empennage

Nose Landing Gear

Rest Part of the RH flap	LH Landing Gear
	
LH Thrust Reverser	**LHS Engine**