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


World Food
Programme

Hunger Hotspots

FAO–WFP early warnings
on acute food insecurity

November 2025 to May 2026 outlook



Global Network
Against Food Crises
INTEGRATED ACTIONS FOR LASTING SOLUTIONS



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
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Map of early warning hunger hotspots: November 2025 to May 2026



Source of data: WFP and FAO. 2025. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (November 2025 to May 2026)*. Rome.

Source of map: United Nations Geospatial. 2025. Map of the World. In: *United Nations*. [Cited 7 April 2025]. <https://www.un.org/geospatial/content/map-world-1>. Refer to the disclaimer on page ii for the names and boundaries used in this map. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

Note: The displacement icon is used when displacement is a key driver of acute food insecurity, or when it is a significant factor contributing to vulnerability, even if not a direct driver. It applies to internally displaced persons as well as migrants and refugees.

Abbreviations

CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GDP	gross domestic product
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
HNRP	Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan
IDP	internally displaced person
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme



Executive summary

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) warn that acute food insecurity is likely to worsen across 16 countries and territories between November 2025 and May 2026, prompting an early warning for urgent humanitarian action in these identified hunger hotspots.

Compared with the previous edition of the report, the **Sudan, Palestine, South Sudan, Mali** and **Haiti** remain at the highest concern level, requiring the most urgent attention. **Yemen** has been elevated to the hotspots of highest concern, as pockets of the population are projected to face Catastrophe (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 5) food security outcomes. This category includes hotspots facing Famine or risk of Famine, as well as populations already in Catastrophe, or hotspots at risk of deteriorating towards catastrophic conditions.

The **Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar** and **Nigeria** remain hotspots of very high concern. **Somalia** and the **Syrian Arab Republic** have been elevated to this category, together with **Afghanistan**, which has re-entered the list of hotspots following its last appearance in November 2023. **Burkina Faso** and **Chad** remain hotspots, with **Kenya** and the situation of the **Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh** added to the list.

Armed conflict and violence remain the primary driver of acute food insecurity, affecting 14 of the 16 contexts, including every hotspot of highest concern. **Global economic fragility, high debt burdens and uneven recovery are also expected to continue deepening acute food insecurity** across several hotspots. Beyond conflict and economic crises, **weather extremes and increased climate variability are further exacerbating acute food insecurity**. La Niña conditions, expected to persist until early 2026, heighten the risk of floods, droughts and tropical cyclones across several regions. Despite the cut off date of 23 October of this report, the humanitarian situation is very fluid at the time of publishing, in particular in the Sudan and in the Gaza Strip, and requires close monitoring.

By late 2025, **the international community faces a narrowing window of opportunity to prevent mass starvation and widespread deaths**. Famines are never inevitable – they are almost always foreseeable, preventable and driven by human

actions. Famine is considered a failure of the humanitarian system.

Pre-emptive, coordinated humanitarian responses are essential to saving lives, protecting livelihoods and preventing further destabilization. **Famine prevention** requires greater coherence in political commitments, funding allocations and interventions along the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. This includes acting early when signs of acute food insecurity and malnutrition appear, supporting livelihoods and improving access to essential services – rather than relying solely on food assistance.

Against this background, **funding for food, emergency agriculture and nutrition assistance remains critically insufficient. This threatens to deepen acute food insecurity and malnutrition, and leave millions without life-saving support**. Programme coverage by humanitarian actors has been severely reduced, and rations have been sharply cut, forcing reductions even for highly vulnerable populations. Reduced treatment for acute malnutrition is also likely to leave millions of children at heightened risk of disease and death. At the same time, the capacity of humanitarian actors to accurately collect and analyse reliable food security and nutrition data may weaken over time.

The latest analysis from the Global Network Against Food Crises shows that **most financing for food crises is directed at addressing the symptoms of emergencies rather than their underlying causes**. In this context, integrated efforts, data sharing and innovative approaches to anticipate and prevent food crises offer the most effective path forward for humanitarian actors and vulnerable communities.

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods across all hunger hotspots and is critical in those of highest concern to prevent starvation and further loss of life. At the same time, substantially **greater investment in**

anticipatory action is needed to mitigate emerging needs and reduce the impact of disasters.

Early intervention not only saves lives but also minimizes food gaps and protects assets and livelihoods at significantly lower

cost than delayed responses. To this end, the report provides **country-specific recommendations** for urgent emergency responses, as well as anticipatory measures to meet immediate humanitarian needs and implement short-term protective interventions before new crises unfold.



Introduction

In this report covering November 2025 to May 2026, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) identify 16 hunger hotspots.

These are marked by very high levels of acute food insecurity, with conditions expected to deteriorate significantly during the outlook period compared with a similar timeframe one year earlier.

Compared with the previous edition of the report, published in June 2025, **Afghanistan**, the population of **Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh**, and **Kenya** have been newly classified as hunger hotspots. Afghanistan has re-entered the list after its last appearance in November 2023 due to drought and increasing inflows of returnees. Among Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, acute food security is likely to deteriorate further as a result of weak purchasing power, climate shocks and funding shortfalls. The Rohingya refugee situation was last included in July 2020, when the entire country was classified

as a hotspot. Kenya has been reintroduced to the list, marking its first inclusion since November 2024. In Kenya, continued below-average rains are expected to affect agricultural production, while localized conflict and high food prices further compound challenges.

The Hunger Hotspots report is an early warning, forward-looking publication that identifies areas where acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate significantly during the outlook period. As such, it does not cover all countries, situations or territories of concern with high levels of acute food insecurity and protracted crises, which nonetheless still require close monitoring. In this edition, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique and selected areas of Colombia and Cameroon require monitoring.

Figure 1. The categories of Hunger Hotspots



Situations requiring monitoring

Several other situations, while not identified as hunger hotspots in this report, merit close monitoring. These include:

- Situations where data were insufficient, or not available to allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied methodology, but which were flagged as concerning during discussions based on other evidence; and
- Situations in protracted crisis with high numbers and/or high prevalence of people in acute food insecurity, but without clear evidence of a likely food security deterioration comparable with trends observed in hunger hotspots.

Methodology

The identification of hunger hotspots is based on a forward-looking analysis that highlights where acute food insecurity is most likely to worsen significantly.


This process is grounded in consensus among food security experts, conflict analysts and specialists in economics and natural hazards from both FAO and WFP, at headquarters and in the field. Hotspot identification is informed by an initial prioritization using a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators, as shown in Figure 2.

The report prioritizes the use of IPC and CH data to assess populations in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Where recent IPC/CH data are not available, estimates are derived, if available, from CARI. Populations classified as

moderately food insecure and severely food insecure under WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Additional sources include estimates of people in need of food and livelihood assistance from the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRPs).¹

Further details are available in the hotspots selection process appendix at the end of the report. The cutoff date for analysis and information in this report was 23 October 2025.

Figure 2. Qualitative and quantitative indicators used to provide the Hunger Hotspots analysis



Source: Authors' own elaboration.

Anticipatory action and emergency response

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods across all hunger hotspots. In hotspots of highest concern, such action is critical to prevent starvation and loss of life.

To support this, the report provides recommendations for anticipatory actions and emergency responses, tailored to the identified risks:

- **Anticipatory actions** refer to short-term disaster risk management interventions implemented in the critical window between an early-warning trigger – when forecasts indicate a likely hazard – and the impact of that hazard on lives and livelihoods. These actions aim to protect the most vulnerable populations and their livelihoods before a shock occurs. In protracted crises, anticipatory actions are recommended where appropriate.

Note: Anticipatory action recommendations are included only when the risk analysis identifies a hazard or shock that is likely to occur but has not yet materialized during the outlook period. If a hazard or shock has already impacted agricultural livelihoods and food security, the window for anticipatory action is considered closed – even if the effects are expected to persist into the present and future. In such cases, this report includes only emergency response recommendations.

- **Emergency response** involves actions aimed at addressing current or emerging humanitarian needs. The amount and duration of emergency assistance are determined through rapid assessments that provide information on acute food security and nutrition needs.

Given the extended outlook period of this report, recommendations for both anticipatory actions and emergency response are indicative. They are intended for implementation only if early-warning triggers are met or clear early-warning signs manifest. Some recommendations also include preparedness measures, which are crucial for enabling the timely and effective implementation of anticipatory actions and emergency response.

Figure 3. IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

PHASE	TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION	PRIORITY RESPONSE OBJECTIVE
1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Resilience building and disaster risk reduction.
2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Disaster risk reduction and protection of livelihoods.
3 Crisis	Households either: Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; OR are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
4 Emergency	Some households either: Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to save lives and livelihoods.
5 Catastrophe/ Famine*	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality).	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

* Some households can be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). Given the severity and implications of classifying Famine, specific IPC protocols have been developed, and special considerations are identified in the IPC Technical Manual 3.1 (see pp. 24–25 for more details on criteria: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en). A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC/CH Phase 5 thresholds. Depending on the quality and quantity of evidence available, Famine can be classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) with solid evidence or as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) with reasonable evidence.

Source: IPC. 2021. *IPC Technical Manual 3.1. Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security and Nutrition Decisions*. Rome. https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en

Global Network Against Food Crises

This report is part of a series of analytical products produced under the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) initiative, which aims to enhance and coordinate the generation and dissemination of evidence-based information and analysis to prevent and address food crises.

In September 2025, GNAFC – together with the Food Security Information Network – released the update of the 2025 Global Report on Food Crises. Out of the 65 countries and territories selected for the 2025 Global Report on Food Crises, the September update presents high levels of acute food insecurity

for the 41 countries and territories with data covering 2025 as of 22 August 2025. The report is available at: <https://www.fightfoodcrises.net/food-crises>

While the Global Report on Food Crises provides a retrospective overview of food crisis contexts – reporting on the previous year's food security situation and offering preliminary forecasts for the current year – the Hunger Hotspots report offers a forward-looking, early-warning analysis. It identifies countries and contexts where acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate over a five- or seven-month outlook period.



Upcoming trends of acute food insecurity drivers

Organized violence and conflict risks

In the outlook period from November 2025 to May 2026, conflict and other forms of armed violence represent a primary driver in 14 of the 16 hotspots where acute food insecurity is likely to worsen. They play a major role in driving the catastrophic conditions affecting people in hotspots at the highest concern level.

Conflict and violence drive acute food insecurity in multiple mutually reinforcing ways, including through the displacement of civilians, the destruction of food systems and constraints on humanitarian access. By the end of 2024, conflict and violence had displaced a record 123 million people,² reducing food production capacity and increasing pressure on local resources and food markets in host communities.³ Looking ahead, food systems are likely to remain under threat as violence disrupts agricultural production and market functioning,⁴ driving up food prices in conflict-affected areas. Insecurity and shifting frontlines are further expected to deepen acute food insecurity among the most vulnerable populations, hinder humanitarian access and constrain the delivery of life-saving food assistance.

The key drivers that led to the confirmation of Famine conditions in the **Sudan** are not expected to improve significantly in conflict-affected areas during the outlook period of this report,⁵ as violence continues to escalate in famine-affected areas across Kordofan and Northern Darfur,^{6,7} driving further displacement.⁸

In **Palestine**, while food assistance partially increased in the Gaza Strip through September and since the ceasefire in mid-October, food and nutrition needs remain critical due to high levels of destruction of infrastructure as well as the impact of prolonged humanitarian movement restrictions and operational constraints.⁹ Famine was confirmed in the Gaza Governorate in late August and projected to expand to the Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates by end September amid intense military operations and extremely constrained humanitarian assistance, while acute food insecurity in North Gaza Governorate was estimated to be as severe – or worse – than in Gaza Governorate.¹⁰ The situation in the West Bank is expected to deteriorate, as military operations, mass demolitions and settler violence continue

to increase and spread to new areas.^{11,12,13} In **Yemen**, ongoing conflict is triggering new displacements, disrupting supply chains, and deepening the economic decline amid extreme humanitarian access constraints, while regional tensions have damaged critical civilian infrastructure.^{14,15,16} Already severe levels of acute food insecurity are likely to increase in the **Syrian Arab Republic**, as instability in various parts of the country continues to drive displacement, disrupt access to essential services and constrain humanitarian operations.¹⁷

The continued influx of refugees and returnees fleeing the Sudanese conflict to **South Sudan**^{18,19} exacerbates already extreme food insecurity driven by internal conflict and related displacement.²⁰ In **Somalia**, armed violence has intensified in southern and central regions since February 2025, while political tensions have escalated in Jubaland and Puntland.²¹

In **Mali**, acute food insecurity is likely to remain at critical levels amid expanding armed conflict and subsequent access constraints,^{22,23,24} while persistent conflict in **Burkina Faso** is expected to continue resulting in widespread displacement,²⁵ elevated food prices²⁶ and constrained humanitarian access.²⁷ The conflict in the Sudan is expected to continue displacing refugees and returnees into eastern provinces of **Chad**,²⁸ intensifying pressure on already scarce resources.²⁹ Insecurity in the Lac region and intercommunal tensions in the south are likely to persist.³⁰ High levels of violence in northern regions of **Nigeria** are expected to continue driving large-scale displacements amid deteriorating humanitarian access.^{31,32,33,34}

The resurgence of armed groups and intensified conflict in eastern **Democratic Republic of the Congo** are likely to continue driving large-scale displacements and disrupting agricultural production and markets.^{35,36}

In **Myanmar**, continued conflict has left millions of people displaced internally or in neighbouring countries, primarily to Cox's Bazar district and Bhashan Char in **Bangladesh**.^{37,38,39,40,41}

In **Haiti**, the expansion of gang violence into previously less-affected districts is likely to drive additional internal displacement and continue to undermine livelihoods, agricultural production and access to food.^{42,43,44,45}



Economic risks

The global economy in 2025 is experiencing subdued growth and persistent uncertainty, affecting countries in different ways. After a post-pandemic rebound, worldwide gross domestic product (GDP) expansion has decelerated to one of its weakest paces in years outside of outright recessions.⁴⁶

The International Monetary Fund projects modest 3 percent growth in 2025, down from 3.2 percent in 2024.⁴⁷ The distribution of this growth is uneven: advanced economies show tepid expansion, while many developing countries continue to struggle to regain pre-pandemic momentum.

Divergence between advanced and developing economies is also reflected in inflation trends, particularly for food prices. International food commodity prices have shown a steady increase in 2025, with the FAO Food Price Index – which measures export prices of key internationally traded food commodities – rising by 3.4 percent year-on-year as of September 2025.⁴⁸ However, these global commodity price movements translate differently into domestic food inflation across countries, depending on local factors such as currency fluctuations, domestic production and value-added costs. As of October 2025, food inflation exceeded 5 percent in 55.6 percent of low-income countries.⁴⁹

Deteriorating macroeconomic conditions have been a major trend in 2025 in low- and middle-income countries, which are more likely to be affected by rising debt burdens and high international interest rates.⁵⁰ Developing nations paid a record USD 921 billion in interest on public debts in 2024, a 10 percent year-on-year increase.⁵¹ The upward trend is likely to persist in 2025 as trade disruptions due to tariffs and geopolitical tensions continue to worsen the terms of

trade for many developing economies. As a result, many debt-burdened countries have reduced capacity to support their currencies, invest in their economies and attract foreign capital, while increasingly implementing austerity measures that impact household purchasing power and employment opportunities.

These global macroeconomic headwinds are manifesting acutely across the hunger hotspots analysed in this report.

In **Asia, Myanmar** faces a severe economic crisis, with high inflation eroding household purchasing power, particularly in conflict-affected areas.^{52, 53, 54} In **Afghanistan**, high unemployment and weak demand are expected to constrain the potential for recovery,⁵⁵ while inflation continues to strain the purchasing power of **Rohingya refugees** in Cox's Bazar and Bhashan Char, as well as host communities in Cox's Bazar, in **Bangladesh**.⁵⁶

In **Eastern Africa, South Sudan's** economy is projected to contract by more than 30 percent in 2025 amid disrupted oil revenues and acute liquidity constraints.^{57, 58} **Kenya** faces elevated maize prices following reduced 2024 production, while another dry season raises concerns over reduced supplies and persistently high prices.⁵⁹

In **Latin America and the Caribbean, Haiti** entered its seventh consecutive year of economic contraction in 2025, with annual food inflation reaching 35.1 percent in September 2025.^{60, 61}

In the **Near East and North Africa**, multiple interconnected economic crises are deepening. The **Sudan's** conflict-driven economic crisis is expected to keep inflation

above 60 percent in 2026.^{62, 63, 64} In **Palestine**, while the ceasefire has opened a window of opportunity to rehabilitate agricultural land and infrastructure in the Gaza Strip,⁶⁵ household purchasing power continues to be challenged given unaffordable prices and lack of access to livelihoods. In the West Bank, falling incomes, asset sales and reliance on borrowing signal eroding resilience.⁶⁶ In **Yemen**, the GDP is projected to contract by 0.5 percent in 2025,⁶⁷ while Sana'a-Based Authorities-controlled areas face acute liquidity shortages.^{68, 69} The **Syrian Arab Republic's** protracted economic crisis – marked by low wages and persistent currency depreciation – continues to severely constrain purchasing power.^{70, 71, 72}

In **Western Africa**, **Nigeria** faces double-digit inflation for the tenth consecutive year in 2025, amid currency instability.^{73, 74, 75} **Burkina Faso** is experiencing conflict-driven market disruptions and high transport costs, pushing cereal prices 15–30 percent above the five-year average.⁷⁶ **Chad's** population is contending with persistently weak purchasing power amid elevated transport costs and market disruptions in conflict-affected areas.^{77, 78, 79}

Natural hazard risks

The global climate outlook for November 2025 to May 2026 indicates that La Niña conditions are currently present and are expected to persist through December 2025 to February 2026, with a transition to El Niño–Southern Oscillation-neutral conditions likely between January and March 2026.⁸⁰ La Niña typically shifts rainfall patterns, increasing the likelihood of floods, droughts and tropical cyclones in many regions, while generally suppressing hurricane activity in the eastern Pacific and enhancing it in the Atlantic. Seasonal forecasts indicate widespread anomalies, with drier-than-average conditions expected in northern East Africa and in the Near East and North Africa, and wetter-than-average conditions anticipated across the Sahel and localized areas of East Africa.

East Africa remains highly vulnerable. In **South Sudan**, floods pose a major threat, with up to 1.6 million people at risk as the Nile and its tributaries overflow, while rainfall deficits in eastern areas are expected to reduce cereal production, exacerbating already extreme food insecurity.⁸¹ **Somalia** and **Kenya** are forecast to face another below-average rainy season, threatening crops and pastures.⁸²



In the **Near East and North Africa**, drought and floods are intensifying the impact of conflict and macroeconomic challenges. The **Sudan** experienced abundant rains that partly boosted yields but also triggered floods and displacement,⁸³ while the risk of further flooding remains elevated. In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, the 2025 drought, the most intense countrywide in decades,^{84, 85} devastated crop yields, reduced summer cropping areas, increased water shortages and deteriorated pastures.⁸⁶ Forecasts indicate below-average rainfall in the upcoming season, which could further intensify food insecurity.⁸⁷ In **Yemen**, seasonal dryness was followed by heavy rains,⁸⁸ and flooding from August through September damaged irrigation infrastructure and drinking water wells, increasing risks of waterborne diseases.⁸⁹ Limited input availability and climatic shocks are expected to result in a below-average 2025 cereal harvest, undermining agricultural livelihoods.⁹⁰

In **Asia**, natural hazards and climatic extremes continue to undermine livelihoods and exacerbate acute food insecurity. In **Afghanistan**, drought conditions in northern and western regions reduced agricultural production and availability of fodder,⁹¹ while a major earthquake in the east undermined rural livelihoods and household food access.⁹² **Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh** were affected by heavy rains in mid-2025 that triggered localized flash floods, while forecasts of above-average rainfall through November are likely to sustain flood and landslide risks.⁹³ In **Myanmar**, repeated flooding across several areas destroyed crops and killed livestock, resulting in substantial livelihood losses for populations already affected by conflict.⁹⁴

In **West Africa**, climate shocks are aggravating fragile food systems. In **Mali**, forecast below-average precipitation through the end of the rainy season is likely to negatively affect rainfed paddy development.⁹⁵ In **Nigeria**, mixed weather conditions, characterized by precipitation deficits, heavy rains and floods, have already affected agricultural production,^{96, 97, 98} while forecasts of adverse weather conditions prevail,⁹⁹ with further negative effects on prospects in several areas. Forecasts of above-average rainfall through October in **Burkina Faso** and **Chad** may benefit crops but also heighten localized flood risks.¹⁰⁰


Southern Africa is entering the rainy season, with forecasts indicating average to above-average rainfall. This could support recovery from recent shocks but also increase the risk of floods and cyclones. In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, severe floods in the Kinshasa region caused losses of critical maize crops and destroyed livelihoods.¹⁰¹

In **Latin America and the Caribbean**, below-average precipitation between May and July affected main-season crop yields in **Haiti**, and heavy rainfall since the end of September has caused flooding in several departments, damaging crops and sweeping away livestock.^{102, 103, 104} At the end of October, Hurricane Melissa, a Category 5 storm – one of the strongest ever recorded in the Atlantic – caused widespread devastation across the Caribbean including in Haiti compounding existing vulnerabilities in affected areas.¹⁰⁵



The number of people in high levels of acute food insecurity in hunger hotspots

In 2025–2026 (where available, most recent data), in millions¹



● IPC/CH Phase 3 or equivalent

● IPC/CH Phase 4 or equivalent

● IPC/CH Phase 5 or equivalent

● Moderately food insecure (WFP CARI scale)⁷

● Severely food insecure (WFP CARI scale)⁷

NOTES

- The data presented are the most recent projections; data are from 2025 except for Burkina Faso and the Syrian Arab Republic (both 2024).
- Most current data reported area non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 15.
- Data for 2025 are from pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP, as a basis for generating results for the Myanmar 2026 HNRP.
- Based on WFP CARI. Data are from 2024. Refers to the number of people in need of food security and livelihood assistance.
- Population coverage is 94 percent excluding N'Djamena, it also includes refugees and returnees calculated from an additional CH analysis.
- Data for 2025 are non peak. This is due to the inability to classify North Gaza, therefore making these figures an underestimate. They only include the populations analysed and classified in Gaza, Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates and exclude any remaining population in Rafah as it is largely uninhabited.
- Populations that are classified as moderately food insecure and severely food insecure as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).
- Prevalence of the population analysed expressed in percentage terms.

The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC analytical framework. For details see: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en

Reduction of humanitarian assistance

The current humanitarian landscape is marked by a call for hyper-prioritization due to severely limited funding.


While 300 million people worldwide require humanitarian assistance in 2025, the Global Humanitarian Overview focuses on only the 114 million whose lives are most at risk.¹¹⁸ In the food security sector, operational targets cover roughly one quarter of those identified by the 2025 Global Report on Food Crises as needing urgent food and livelihood assistance.¹¹⁹

As of end of October 2025, only USD 10.55 billion out of the USD 29 billion required to assist those most at risk had been received.¹²⁰ Nearly all the hotspots featured in this edition that had an HNRP or a Joint Response Plan in 2025 underwent hyper-prioritization,¹²¹ reducing the number of targeted people in the food security sector across 11 of the 16 countries and territories with hunger hotspots from 68.2 million to 47.6 million, and the financial requirements from USD 7.3 billion to USD 4.3 billion.^{122, 123}

Humanitarian funding for food sectors in food crises began declining in 2023, with a 31 percent reduction from 2022 levels, followed by a 5 percent decrease in 2024. In 2025, it is expected to decline by an additional 25 percent.¹²⁴

Programme coverage by humanitarian actors has been severely reduced, and rations have been sharply cut, forcing reductions even for highly vulnerable populations. Food assistance for refugee operations is at a breaking point. WFP targets 10.8 million refugees with food assistance across 43 countries; of these, 40 refugee operations are facing funding shortfalls in the six months from September 2025 to February 2026.¹²⁵ In hunger hotspot countries, WFP has been forced to apply increasingly stringent targeting criteria, reducing the number of refugees receiving assistance (Afghanistan, the Sudan, South Sudan, Chad), and in some countries combining this with reduced

Figure 4. People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in food crisis countries and territories, and humanitarian and development allocations to food sectors in food crisis contexts



Source of data: GNAFC. (forthcoming). 2025 Financing Flows and Food Crises Report. Rome.

Reduction of humanitarian assistance (continued)

rations (Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burkina Faso). For example, in Uganda, over 1 million refugees no longer receive assistance in 2025, while those still covered have seen rations reduced to 40 percent of requirements in 2024. Assistance to populations experiencing emergency and catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity is at risk, as they typically live in hard-to-access areas and reductions in funding lead to trade-offs between reaching a large number of affected people with lower needs or fewer people with higher needs. In Haiti, for the first time since 2016, no full contingency stock was in place during the peak of the hurricane season.¹²⁶

Against this background, reductions in finances for humanitarian assistance are likely to increase the severity of acute food insecurity. Declines in treatment coverage for acute malnutrition are also expected to leave millions of children in need and at heightened risk of disease and death. At the same time, the capacity of humanitarian actors to accurately collect and analyse reliable food security and nutrition data may weaken over time.

In line with the Humanitarian Reset, the global humanitarian community is called to prioritize funding for the most critical emergencies and, wherever possible, transition towards resilience-building and addressing the root causes of protracted crises. Stabilizing services, such as education and livelihoods, are being deprioritized and long-term investments are largely excluded, limiting support for household and community recovery.¹²⁷

Collaboration with development actors will be essential to ensure synergies maximize the most efficient use of limited resources. Integrated efforts, data sharing and innovative approaches to anticipate and prevent food crises remain the most effective way forward for humanitarian actors and vulnerable communities.¹²⁸

A total of 11 countries have appeared almost continuously in all 12 editions of the *Hunger Hotspots: FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity report* since 2020 – many of which have had large populations facing critical levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4) for recurrent and/or prolonged periods, and in some cases, people experiencing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 5).¹²⁹ In these contexts, the prolonged use of negative coping mechanisms in the face of conflict and displacement, often compounded by weather extremes and economic hardship, has eroded livelihoods and reduced the capacity of households to maintain food security and nutrition.^{130, 131, 132, 133}

These 11 countries have required external food assistance every year since at least 2016, and in some cases – including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Somalia and the Sudan – every year for more than 30 years, as the impact of shocks are often long-lasting and overlapping.^{134, 135} Evidence produced by GNAFC demonstrates that the majority of financing for food crises is directed at addressing the symptoms of emergencies rather than their underlying causes, as the food sector financing in crisis contexts remains predominantly humanitarian, with particularly low development investments when food crises are protracted.¹³⁶

While this report aims to enhance understanding of food crises, primarily to guide humanitarian action, hunger hotspots require not only scaled-up humanitarian responses but also greater integration with long-term assistance. In these countries, livelihoods have eroded over time, and household food production and incomes remain insufficient to meet basic needs. Resilience-building interventions are essential for populations that have become heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance and particularly vulnerable to funding reductions.

Navigating Famine risks: emerging threats and global response challenges

In Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5), populations face an extreme lack of food and are unable to meet their basic needs; starvation and death are widespread. In this phase, livelihoods have collapsed, lives and futures have been lost, and social safety nets and community networks have been severely disrupted.

In most cases, famines build gradually over time due to long-term drivers such as conflict, extreme drought, poverty and the breakdown of government and institutions. Famines are never inevitable – they are almost always foreseeable, preventable and driven by human actions. Famine is considered a failure of the humanitarian system.¹³⁷

Famines tend to occur in contexts of conflict, extreme vulnerability, poverty and marginalization, where livelihoods and coping strategies have been exhausted and access to basic services is increasingly lacking. Greater coherence in political commitments, funding allocations and interventions along the humanitarian–development–peace nexus is needed. This includes acting early when signs of acute food insecurity and malnutrition appear, supporting livelihoods, and improving access to essential services, rather than relying on food assistance alone.^{138, 139, 140}

Access constraints are key contributing factors to famine. Insecurity, bureaucratic impediments and physical isolation continue to obstruct aid delivery in many contexts. At the same time, global humanitarian funding is declining (see section on Reduction of humanitarian assistance, pp. 10–11). This funding gap is forcing reductions in food rations and limiting the reach of life-saving interventions.

In recent years, conflict has led to **Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)** in the Gaza Strip and the Sudan, and there is a projected risk of Famine in parts of South Sudan under a worst-case scenario. Over the past 15 years, famine has been confirmed only in Somalia (2011), South Sudan (2017 and 2020) and the Sudan (2024).^{*} The famine in the Gaza Strip is the first ever confirmed by the IPC in the Middle East.¹⁴¹

Even before the conflict began in April 2023, the **Sudan** ranked among the world's worst food crises.¹⁴² Since then, ongoing conflict and displacement have led to economic collapse and restricted humanitarian access.¹⁴³ IPC partners' recommendations regarding Famine (IPC Phase 5) in the Sudan remain focused on enabling

humanitarian access to provide essential life-saving services, protect civilians, collect basic data on human welfare, and, most importantly, to urgently end the conflict.¹⁴⁴

In the **Gaza Strip**, the entire territory faced a risk of famine throughout 2024.¹⁴⁵ As of August 2025, Famine (IPC Phase 5) was confirmed in Gaza Governorate between July and mid-August, with projections indicating that Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis could also cross Famine thresholds by late September. The IPC warned that without an immediate and sustained ceasefire and without the provision of sustained, full-scale, multisectoral humanitarian response, famine-related mortality would have escalated rapidly.¹⁴⁶

In **South Sudan**, the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) was reported in Luakpiny/Nasir and Ulang counties in Upper Nile State at least through July 2025, mostly due to intensifying conflict. Urgent and immediate action is needed for these populations, including large-scale and multisectoral response and the protection of humanitarian access, to prevent the collapse of livelihoods, rising starvation, increased deaths and further deterioration.^{147, 148}

By late 2025, the international community faces a narrowing window to prevent mass starvation and widespread deaths. Pre-emptive, coordinated humanitarian responses are essential to save lives, protect livelihoods and prevent further destabilization. **Delaying action until Famine is confirmed costs lives.** Populations in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) are already experiencing rising acute malnutrition, while those in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) face increasing mortality – clear signs that the crisis is well under way. Timely intervention at these stages is not only life-saving but also cost-effective, reducing the need for expensive emergency responses later. Decision-makers must act before conditions deteriorate further, scaling up food, nutrition and livelihood assistance as soon as early-warning signs appear. Waiting for Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) to intervene is a failure of foresight – by then, it is too late for many.¹⁴⁹

* The Government of the Sudan did not endorse the December 2024 IPC analysis results.



Highest concern: Hunger hotspots with catastrophic conditions

In the **Sudan**, Famine (IPC Phase 5) was first detected in July 2024 in Zamzam camp, El Fasher, North Darfur,¹⁵⁰ and later in 2024 in five other camps in North Darfur and parts of South and West Kordofan. The IPC Famine Review Committee projected Famine would expand to five additional areas in North Darfur by May 2025, with 17 others across Darfur and the Central Nuba Mountains at risk.^{151,*} Famine conditions were expected to persist through September 2025, driven by conflict and restricted humanitarian access. For the outlook period, key drivers are unlikely to improve in conflict-affected areas, as violence continues to escalate in famine-affected regions across Kordofan and Northern Darfur, driving displacement.¹⁵² Flood risks are likely to undermine food production during the October–December 2025 harvest,¹⁵³ while food access is further eroded by the economic crisis and extreme access constraints.¹⁵⁴ By July 2025, the cost of essential food nearly doubled,¹⁵⁵ while in El Fasher prices of sorghum tripled and millet doubled between June and July, raising serious concerns for access to food.¹⁵⁶ Overall, around 24.6 million people – or over half of the population – were projected to face acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) through May 2025, including 8 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 637 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).^{157, 158,*}

In **Palestine**, despite a partial resumption of humanitarian assistance since the ceasefire agreement reached in mid-October, needs in the Gaza Strip remain critical and largely unmet.¹⁵⁹ Famine (IPC Phase 5) was confirmed in Gaza Governorate through mid-August 2025 and was projected to expand further to Deir Al Balah and Khan Younis by the end of September, amid intense military operations and extreme humanitarian access constraints.¹⁶⁰ The entire population analysed in the Gaza Strip was assessed as acutely food insecure and requiring urgent assistance,¹⁶¹ amid near-total collapse of the food system. Most individuals had been displaced multiple times due to conflict and evacuation orders, severely disrupting access to food.¹⁶² By the end of September, nearly 641 000 people – almost one-third of the population analysed – were expected to face Catastrophe conditions (IPC Phase 5), while 1.14 million were likely in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Conditions in North Gaza Governorate were estimated to be as severe – or worse – than in Gaza Governorate, but limited data prevented IPC

classification. Rafah Governorate was not analysed, as it was largely depopulated. For the outlook period, the restoration of aid and commercial flows must be comprehensive, not partial, to reverse the catastrophic food security conditions confirmed in August 2025.¹⁶³ Conditions in the West Bank are rapidly worsening amid intensifying military operations, demolitions and settler violence.¹⁶⁴


In **Yemen**, escalating conflict, damage to infrastructure and extreme humanitarian access constraints, compounded by severe humanitarian funding cuts, are expected to worsen acute food insecurity over the outlook period.¹⁶⁵ Pockets of the population are projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in four districts of Amran, Al Hodeidah and Hajjah governorates between September 2025 and February 2026. In addition, 5.5 million people are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4),¹⁶⁶ while overall, 18.1 million people – representing 52 percent of the population – are expected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above). Active cross-border conflict and hostilities in the Red Sea are expected to escalate further, deepening the economic decline and triggering new displacements. Despite currency appreciation in July–August,¹⁶⁷ inflation is likely to remain high in Internationally Recognized Government-controlled areas,¹⁶⁸ while Sana’a-Based Authorities-controlled areas will continue to face acute liquidity shortages.¹⁶⁹ Agricultural production in 2025, with harvest expected by November, is also likely to be undermined by climatic shocks. Floods from August to September damaged farmland, irrigation infrastructure and wells, particularly in Lahij, Ta’izz and Ma’rib, reducing livelihoods and increasing risks of waterborne diseases.^{170, 171}

In **South Sudan**, extremely critical levels of food insecurity are reported, driven by ongoing conflict, particularly in Upper Nile and Jonglei states. The latest IPC analysis indicated that by July 2025, about 83 000 people were expected to experience catastrophic acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5), mainly in conflict-affected areas or among returnees who fled the conflict in the Sudan. Populations in Luakpiny/Nasir and Ulang counties in Upper Nile State were reported as being at risk of Famine under a worst-case scenario.¹⁷² Between April and July 2025, 7.7 million people – 57 percent of the analysed population – faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2.4 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).¹⁷³ The latest

* The Government of the Sudan did not endorse the December 2024 IPC analysis results.

High acute food insecurity trends in hunger hotspots of highest concern

2020–2026¹ peak numbers and prevalence



NOTES

- 1 Data for 2025 and 2026 are considered as expected peak based on information available as of October 2025. For the Sudan, data for the expected peak period in 2025–2026 are not available.
- 2 Data for 2023, 2024 and 2025 come from IPC analyses. Data for 2022 are from Humanitarian Needs Overview, while data for 2020–2021 are based on the SEFSec methodology, with acute food insecurity prevalence referring to households rather than individuals. These sources use different methodologies, which limits comparability. The 2020 and 2021 figures refer to the same analysis (SEFSec 2020, published in 2021); therefore, the 2020 estimate does not align with the source used in the Global Report on Food Crises.
- 3 Although a projection covering up to May 2025 is available, it covers the post-harvest period and may not reflect the peak in needs amid escalating conflict.
- 4 Data for 2020–2022 and 2025–2026 are from IPC, while data for 2023 and 2024 come from the Famine Early Warning Systems Network and represent the upper bound of a range. Comparability across years is limited. Peak data for 2025 and 2026 are derived from the same analysis.

Comparison over time indicates a general trend; however, comparability issues exist:

- (i) Coverage differences: Haiti – larger coverage of urban areas in 2020; the Sudan – increase in total population estimates between 2020 and 2023.
- (ii) Differences in analysis periods for Haiti, Palestine and Yemen.

Caution should be exercised when reading and using this analysis. Trends in prevalence and total numbers may diverge due to changes in the populations covered. Populations classified as moderately food insecure and severely food insecure under WFP's CARL methodology are reported as an approximation of populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).



IPC analysis also indicates a deepening acute malnutrition crisis in South Sudan, with the burden increasing from 2.1 million to 2.3 million acutely malnourished children under 5 years of age.^{174, 175} Conflict is expected to intensify during the outlook period, driving further displacement and disrupting livelihoods, with nearly 2 million people already internally displaced, while continued arrivals from the Sudan are placing additional strain on overstretched host communities.¹⁷⁶ Weather and economic shocks are compounding the crisis: rainfall deficits have reduced yields, while widespread flooding has affected about 927 000 people and threatens up to 1.6 million between September and December 2025.¹⁷⁷ Although oil exports have partially resumed, revenues remain disrupted, and GDP is projected to contract by more than 30 percent in 2025, with inflation to reach 66 percent.¹⁷⁸

In **Mali**, critical levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist, driven by conflict that continues to disrupt livelihoods and markets.^{179, 180} Armed violence has expanded geographically^{181, 182} and is likely to further constrain access and trigger new internal displacements, while insecurity in Burkina Faso is expected to sustain cross-border refugee inflows.¹⁸³ Food prices in conflict-affected areas are anticipated to remain elevated due to supply chain disruptions, further limiting food access. Adverse weather conditions and

insecurity are undermining agricultural production, with limited access to inputs, localized flooding and a reduced cultivated area in conflict-affected regions.¹⁸⁴ According to the latest available CH analysis, around 1.5 million people were projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) between June and August 2025, including 64 200 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) in Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Tombouctou, and 2 600 people in Ménaka at risk of Catastrophe (CH Phase 5).¹⁸⁵

In **Haiti**, expanding gang violence, a protracted economic crisis, and the impact of floods will further undermine livelihoods and agricultural production, likely driving a deterioration of already critical levels of acute food insecurity over the outlook period. By June 2026, around 5.9 million people – over half the population – are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).^{186, 187} An expansion of armed violence into previously less-affected areas is expected to drive further displacement, adding to the 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) recorded as of June 2025.¹⁸⁸ A likely decline in cereal production, high food prices and insecurity-related supply chain disruptions will further constrain food availability and access.^{189, 190}

Regional ramifications of the crisis in the Sudan

Driven by a relentless conflict, the Sudan remains at the centre of the world's largest regional displacement crisis, with cross-border movements of people fleeing into neighbouring countries showing no signs of slowing.

As violence and destruction continue to escalate across parts of the country, particularly in the Greater Kordofan region and in North Darfur State, more Sudanese and other nationals are expected to flee across borders in search of safety during the outlook period. By mid-September 2025, cross-border displacement had nearly doubled since the conflict began in April 2023, with over 4 million having sought refuge in neighbouring countries.¹⁰⁶

The outlook remains bleak, as fighting is likely to further intensify around strategic towns, with sieges tightening around regional capitals in Kordofan and North Darfur.^{107, 108} While conflict has subsided in Khartoum and other parts of the country, Greater Kordofan in the centre-south, has become the epicentre of fighting. Violence has also persisted in North Darfur's state capital, El Fasher, one of the conflict's most contested frontlines.¹⁰⁹ Despite the rainy season limiting mobility in some areas, the growing use of drones and aerial warfare suggests that violence is likely to persist.¹¹⁰

Since the previous edition of this report, more than 300 000 additional people – including Sudanese nationals and citizens of other countries – have crossed the Sudan's borders seeking safety, protection and assistance.¹¹¹ **Egypt** (1.5 million), **South Sudan** (1.2 million) and **Chad** (877 000) remain the primary destinations, owing to historical ties, geographic proximity, accessible border crossings and existing social connections.¹¹² **Libya** has been receiving increasing arrivals from the Sudan, with an uptick recorded since mid-2024. While precise figures remain difficult to verify, an estimated 357 000 Sudanese

refugees have entered the country since April 2023, most of them in Alkufra district, including 77 256 registered by the UN Refugee Agency.¹¹³ **Ethiopia** currently hosts more than 76 000 Sudanese refugees, while **Uganda** and the **Central African Republic** have received 87 000 and 36 000, respectively.¹¹⁴

People fleeing the conflict are arriving in poor nutritional conditions after enduring challenging journeys. In **Chad**, the large influx has placed significant pressure on already impoverished and remote eastern provinces.¹¹⁵ Between June and August 2025, more than 456 000 Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees faced high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above), including nearly 80 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4). In **South Sudan**, the situation is even more severe: around half of the 83 000 people who, in July 2025, were experiencing catastrophic levels of hunger and a collapse of livelihoods (Catastrophe, IPC Phase 5) were returnees from the Sudan.¹¹⁶

While cross-border movements continue to rise, internal displacement inside the Sudan has declined by an estimated 15 percent compared to January 2025, primarily due to returns to central states where conflict has decreased, including Sennar, Al Gezira and Khartoum.¹¹⁷

Displaced populations remain disproportionately affected by severe cuts to aid in a context of hyper-prioritization of humanitarian assistance in 2025. For further details on humanitarian funding reductions, see the section on Reduction of humanitarian assistance on pp.10–11.

Very high concern: Hotspots with deteriorating critical conditions

In **Afghanistan**, elevated levels of acute food insecurity are projected to persist, with recent gains being reversed. This is driven by the severe 2025 drought,¹⁹¹ floods, large-scale returnee inflows and the impact of the August 2025 earthquake,^{192, 193, 194, 195, 196} amid humanitarian funding shortfalls leading to severe reductions in food assistance.¹⁹⁷ Agricultural stocks are expected to fall short for the November–March lean season, with risks of continued dry conditions,¹⁹⁸ while significant refugee returns will continue to further strain resources and affect remittance flows.^{199, 200} Between May and October 2025, 1.6 million people faced Emergency (IPC Phase 4).²⁰¹ A new analysis is currently being finalized and will provide an update on the acute food insecurity situation for the outlook period, with early indications pointing to a deterioration in conditions, as per preliminary findings. According to the nutrition cluster, mother and child malnutrition is showing the worst year-on-year increase ever recorded in Afghanistan.²⁰²

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, already critical levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist due to escalating conflict in eastern areas since January 2025, which has driven widespread displacement – nearly 5.8 million people as of July 2025²⁰³ – and further limited agricultural production and humanitarian access.^{204, 205} A recent Ebola outbreak in Kasai province, a significant increase in forced returns, and critical funding shortfalls are adding complexity to the crisis.^{206, 207} Severe flooding in the Kinshasa region in April–May²⁰⁸ is also likely to disrupt agricultural activities during the outlook period. Between January and June 2025, 3.9 million people were projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4),²⁰⁹ up from 2.9 million in the same period a year earlier.^{210, 211}

Acute food insecurity in **Nigeria** is expected to persist during the outlook period,²¹² due to persistently high levels of conflict in northern areas,²¹³ severe humanitarian access constraints²¹⁴ and mounting economic challenges,^{215, 216} compounded by funding shortfalls for emergency food assistance. A combination of dry conditions in Middle Belt, western and southern states, along with flooding in the northeast, is expected to drive cereal production shortfalls

in 2025.^{217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222} Between June and August 2025, 1.2 million people were projected to face Emergency (CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, including 1.1 million in the conflict-affected northeast and northwest regions.^{223, 224}



In **Somalia**, ongoing drought and conflict, alongside forecasts of another below-average October–December Deyr season,²²⁵ are expected to drive acute food insecurity in early 2026. Consecutive poor seasons – including the March–May 2025 *Gu* with near-record rainfall deficits in the north and the anticipated below-average 2025 Deyr season²²⁶ – are likely to severely strain agricultural and pastoral livelihoods, drive displacements and push food prices higher.^{227, 228, 229} Through December 2025, 921 000 people are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4), with needs likely peaking in January–June 2026.²³⁰

In **Myanmar**, ongoing armed conflict impacting much of the country and the worsening economic crisis are expected to sustain persistently high levels of acute food insecurity.^{231, 232} Continued conflict is likely to drive further displacement, adding to the 3.6 million IDPs and almost 1.6 million refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring countries.^{233, 234} Funding shortfalls, extreme access constraints and the impact of monsoon flooding, which resulted in substantial livelihood losses, are further aggravating the crisis.^{235, 236, 237} Between September and October 2025, 1 million people faced Emergency levels of acute food insecurity.²³⁸

In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, acute food insecurity is expected to worsen in 2025 due to the most severe drought in decades, which has undermined agricultural production, exacerbated water shortages and strained livelihoods, alongside conflict-related displacement, increasing returnees and a protracted economic crisis lowering purchasing power.^{239, 240} Localized violence, coupled with humanitarian funding shortfalls, is likely to constrain assistance^{241, 242} while forecasts of another below-average rainy season are likely to affect planting.²⁴³ Between August and October 2024, 1.3 million people were already experiencing severe food insecurity based on WFP's CARI methodology.²⁴⁴

High acute food insecurity trends in hunger hotspots of very high concern

2020–2026¹ peak numbers and prevalence



Source of data: FAO and WFP. 2025. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (November 2025 to May 2026)*. Rome.

NOTES

- 1 Data for 2025 and 2026 are considered as expected peak based on information available as of September 2025. For the Syrian Arab Republic, no peak data are available for the expected peak period in 2025 and 2026.
 - 2 Peak data for 2022 and 2023 refer to the same analysis.
 - 3 Geographical coverage increased from 85 territories and 18 urban areas in 2020 to 145 territories and 41 urban areas in 2025; therefore, comparability is limited.
 - 4 Data for 2023 come from pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP, as a basis for generating results for the 2024 projection used by the Myanmar HNRP 2024. Data for 2024 are based on HNRP 2024. Data for 2025 are an update of the previous analysis conducted under the HNRP to reflect the impact of the earthquake and significant reductions in humanitarian funding. Data for 2026 are from analysis conducted as a basis for generating results for the Myanmar HNRP 2026.
 - 5 Geographical coverage increased from 16 states and Federal Capital Territory in 2020 to 26 states and Federal Capital Territory in 2025; therefore, comparability is limited.
 - 6 Based on WFP CARL. No peak data are yet available for 2025.
- Comparison over time indicates a general trend; however, comparability issues exist:
- (i) Coverage: Democratic Republic of the Congo – from 65 percent in 2020 to 91 percent in 2021, 94 percent in 2022–2023, and 98 percent in 2024–2025; Nigeria – population coverage increased from 49 percent in 2020 to 73 percent in 2021, 91 percent in 2023, and 89 percent in 2025.
 - (ii) Analysis time periods differ for the Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, Nigeria and Somalia.
- Caution should be exercised when reading and using this analysis. Trends in prevalence and total numbers may diverge due to changes in the populations covered. Populations classified as moderately food insecure and severely food insecure under WFP's CARL methodology are reported as an approximation of populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).

Other situations that require monitoring

Several other situations, while not identified as hunger hotspots in this report, merit close monitoring. These include:

- situations where data were insufficient or not available to allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied methodology, but which were flagged as concerning during the discussions based on other evidence; and
- situations in protracted crisis with high numbers and/or high prevalence of people in acute food insecurity, but without clear evidence for a likely food security deterioration of a level comparable with trends observed in countries selected as hunger hotspots.

Ethiopia

Despite limited recent data, the acute food insecurity situation is expected to improve with October harvests but deteriorate towards the next lean season. Forecasts of below-average October–December rainfall in southern areas are expected to affect crops and pastures,²⁴⁵ while erratic rainfall in northern pastoral areas has driven insufficient pasture availability and below-average livestock body conditions. Conflict in Amhara and Oromia, rising tensions in Tigray and persisting humanitarian access restrictions will continue to undermine food security. Drought and economic challenges are likely to exacerbate humanitarian needs amid reduced funding.^{246, 247, 248}

Colombia (selected areas)

Between January and mid-September 2025, nearly 761 000 people were directly affected by violence, such as attacks against the civilian population, armed strikes, forced displacement, armed actions and use of explosive devices, mainly in **Cauca**, **Norte de Santander** and **Chocó**.²⁴⁹ This represents a more than fourfold increase compared to the same period in 2024.²⁵⁰ Humanitarian access for about 597 000 people was restricted during the first nine months of 2025²⁵¹ – more than double year on year.²⁵² If this upward trend continues, the affected households could face reduced food access and loss of livelihoods. In these regions, forecasts indicate above-average precipitation between November 2025 and March 2026,^{253, 254} posing risks of floods that could further affect mobility and limit livelihood opportunities.

Malawi

High levels of acute food insecurity are expected to persist over the outlook period. In August 2025, maize prices were

61 percent higher year on year,²⁵⁵ following two consecutive harvests well below the five-year-average, erratic weather and cyclone damage in early 2025. While average rainfall is forecast for October–December, which could support a slight crop recovery in some areas,^{256, 257} price pressures are expected to intensify due to ongoing foreign currency shortages and exchange rate instability, further constraining food access and eroding livelihoods.^{258, 259} By March 2025, an estimated 5.7 million people (28 percent of the population) faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including over 416 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – a six-percentage-point increase compared with the previous year.²⁶⁰

Mozambique

Acute food insecurity remains concerning, with nearly 2.7 million people projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between October 2025 and March 2026, including 170 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).^{261, 262} Elevated levels of acute food insecurity in Cabo Delgado will persist due to ongoing conflict and a sharp decline in humanitarian assistance. Amid high levels of displacement,²⁶³ many IDPs and returnees will continue to face limited access to food, services and protection.²⁶⁴ In the southern and central regions, two consecutive poor harvests have driven many households into Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), while forecasts of above-average rains in the south and centre and below-average rains in the north between January and March 2026²⁶⁵ raise risks of both floods and dry spells that could further worsen acute food insecurity.

Cameroon (selected areas)

Despite a decline in the number of violent events,²⁶⁶ ongoing insecurity in the **Far North**, **North-West** and **South-West** regions will continue limiting farmers' access to inputs and fields. In addition, heavy rainfall and flooding²⁶⁷ are expected to further impact agricultural activities, potentially lowering crop yields in 2025 and placing additional pressure on already scarce resources.^{268, 269} Between June and August 2025, 2.6 million people (9 percent of the population) were projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), including over 300 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4) at the national level, with two-thirds of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity located in the three regions affected by insecurity.²⁷⁰



Country risk narratives

Asia and the Pacific

Afghanistan

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: economic stress, drought, floods, earthquake

Acute food insecurity is projected to remain at elevated levels, with recent gains being reversed due to a severe drought in northern and western regions, floods, large-scale inflows of returnees and a major earthquake in the east. Funding shortfalls, leading to severe reductions in food assistance, continue to compound vulnerabilities.^{271, 272}

The 2025 winter and spring seasons saw below-average rainfall, with drought conditions in the north, west and central highlands. This led to a below-average winter wheat harvest and reduced spring crop yields, especially in rainfed areas. Most summer crops also performed poorly, while prolonged drought and reduced wheat production limited fodder and degraded pasture. As a result, many pastoralists were forced to sell livestock earlier than usual.²⁷³

Food stocks are expected to fall short for the November–March lean season, exacerbating acute food insecurity,²⁷⁴ while continued dry conditions could further reduce production. Severe localized flooding in July and August also devastated livelihoods and reduced community resilience.^{275, 276, 277}

Returnees will continue to strain limited resources. By August 2025, 2.5 million Afghan refugees had returned from the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan since late 2023.²⁷⁸ Their return is expected to reduce remittance flows while increasing domestic needs, particularly in urban and peri-urban areas.²⁷⁹ Afghanistan's fragile economy, marked by high unemployment and weak demand, will further constrain recovery.²⁸⁰

On 31 August 2025, a magnitude 6.5 earthquake struck eastern Afghanistan, severely affecting Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman and Nuristan. Assessments indicate over 1.3 million livestock and vital food stocks were affected in Nangarhar and Kunar, undermining rural livelihoods and household food access.^{281, 282, 283, 284}

Between May and October 2025, 9.5 million people (21 percent of the analysed population) faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 1.6 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). While this was an improvement from 2024, gains are already reversing due to natural hazards compounded by humanitarian funding shortfalls, leading to ration cuts and reduced coverage.²⁸⁵

A new analysis is currently being finalized and will provide an update on the acute food insecurity situation for the outlook period, with early indications pointing to a deterioration in conditions, as per preliminary findings.

Child malnutrition shows some of the worst year-on-year increases nationwide. More than 4.7 million women and children are acutely malnourished and in need of treatment, with numbers rising. In 2025, monthly admissions for acute malnutrition were 13 percent higher than in 2024, with the sharpest rise – nearly 29 percent – among pregnant and breastfeeding women. This trend is expected to worsen in the coming months.²⁸⁶



RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute livestock health kits and animal feed to at-risk families ahead of potential winter drought conditions.
- Introduce flexible, shock-responsive cash transfers that can be rapidly deployed when climate shocks are imminent.
- Invest in community-level water management and irrigation infrastructure.
- Provide wheat and other agricultural inputs to households most affected by drought and poor harvests where access to seeds is limited.

Emergency response

The Afghanistan 2025 HNRP calls for USD 1.01 billion to support food security and agriculture interventions, and USD 296.4 million for nutrition.²⁸⁷ The Earthquake Response Plan for the Eastern Region calls for USD 139.6 million to deliver life-saving assistance.²⁸⁸

- Sustain life-saving food and nutrition assistance to the most vulnerable, especially during the winter season.
- Maintain prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition integrated with food security, health and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services.

- Immediate funding is required to restart preventive specialized foods and expand treatment coverage.
- In earthquake-affected Nangarhar and Kunar, combine emergency food assistance with nutrition screening, infant and young child feeding counselling and restoration of livelihoods through feed distribution, veterinary care and irrigation repair. Reinforce mobile health and nutrition teams to remote, displaced and isolated communities.
- Safeguard livelihoods through emergency crop production packages, livestock protection and veterinary care including vaccinations and parasite control, targeting the most vulnerable farming households. Provide earthquake-affected households with agricultural assistance, including cash-for-work schemes for rapid repair of irrigation channels.
- Support emergency school-based feeding programmes while strengthening asset creation and alternative livelihoods to ensure access to food and income.

Other actions

- Continue providing humanitarian logistics services (transport, shelter, storage) to partners responding to natural disasters.



Asia and the Pacific

Myanmar

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic crisis, floods

The combined effects of conflict, economic crisis, monsoon floods and funding shortfalls amid extreme access constraints²⁸⁹ are expected to drive persistently high levels of acute food insecurity as well as an extremely critical malnutrition situation in a hotspot area of northern Rakhine during the outlook period.

Despite ceasefires, armed clashes will continue to drive displacement and humanitarian needs.^{290, 291} Annual inflation is expected to remain high at around 31 percent in the 2025/2026 financial year, eroding purchasing power especially in conflict-affected areas, where food prices registered the steepest increases.²⁹² Domestic supply shocks, driven by the conflict and currency weakness, are expected to keep food prices elevated. Funding shortfalls²⁹³ amid extreme access constraints will further limit assistance provision.

Continued conflict since May 2025, particularly in Sagaing, Rakhine, Mandalay and Northern Shan, disrupted livelihoods and markets and drove displacement.²⁹⁴ During the monsoon season, repeated flooding occurred across several regions and states,²⁹⁵ submerging farmland, destroying crops, killing livestock and causing substantial livelihood losses. Although the overall 2025 cereal production is forecast near average, in conflict-affected areas output is expected to be below average due to disrupted agricultural activities, reduced field access and input shortages.

By the end of August 2025, the number of IDPs was estimated at 3.6 million. About 150 000 people have fled Myanmar over the past 18 months,²⁹⁶ bringing the total number of refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring countries to 1.6 million, of which 1.1 million are in Bangladesh, mostly in Cox's Bazar. Displacement is expected to rise further.^{297, 298, 299}

The March earthquake caused mass displacement and thousands of fatalities, resulting in economic losses of about USD 11 billion (14 percent of GDP) and a 2.5 percent economic contraction in 2025.^{300, 301, 302, 303} These shocks contribute to worsening acute food insecurity in the outlook period.³⁰⁴

Some 11.8 million people (22 percent of the total population) faced high levels of acute food insecurity between September and October 2025, including 1 million people in Emergency.³⁰⁵ In addition, 410 000 children aged under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women faced acute malnutrition between June 2025 and May 2026. In Northern Rakhine, the nutrition situation is projected to rapidly deteriorate to critical Phase 4 in Maungdaw township and to Catastrophe Phase 5 in Buthidaung between November 2025 and May 2026.³⁰⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Myanmar 2025 HNRP calls for USD 306 million for food security interventions and USD 68 million for nutrition.³⁰⁷

- Resume and expand general food distributions and cash-based transfers, targeting vulnerable households affected by conflict, displacement and natural disasters, with strong linkages to nutrition interventions – especially during the peak lean season.
- Prioritize the prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition in earthquake- and conflict-affected provinces, particularly among children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women.
- Provide support to vulnerable farming, fishing and livestock-owning households through the distribution of winter pulse seed packages, fishing gear and livestock feed, while rehabilitating fishponds to help sustain food production during the 2025 winter.

Other actions

- Maintain humanitarian supply chains where access constraints exist by using all available channels – including local networks, crossline and cross-border operations – to reach communities in need.

Asia and the Pacific

Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: economic stress, climate shocks

Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate further among Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar and Bhashan Char due to economic stress, limited livelihood opportunities, declining international support and adverse weather conditions.

Inflation will likely remain high from supply chain disruptions, straining purchasing power, particularly of Rohingya refugees in camps in Cox's Bazar and Bhashan Char as well as host communities in Cox's Bazar.³⁰⁸ The widening gap between rising food prices and weak incomes is evident in the reduced amount of rice that is affordable with a daily wage.³⁰⁹

Recurrent natural hazards sustain risks of further displacement and worsening acute food insecurity. Heavy rains in mid-2025 triggered localized flash floods, while forecasts of above-average rainfall through November heighten flood and landslide risks.³¹⁰

Since early 2024, over 133 000 new arrivals have been recorded. The latest surge of refugees fleeing renewed violence in Rakhine has further strained resources.³¹¹ Current resources will run out in early 2026 for food and nutrition assistance for the entire population.³¹²

Out of the Rohingya population exceeding 1.1 million as of the end of September 2025,³¹³ nearly 446 000 (40 percent of the analysed population) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between May and December 2025, including over 223 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). This marks a sharp deterioration compared to October–December 2024, when full food rations led to temporary improvement. Across Bangladesh, a total of 16 million people (17 percent of the population) are projected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) during the same period, indicating a worrying national trend in food insecurity.³¹⁴ The nutrition situation remains concerning, particularly in the mega camps, where global acute malnutrition exceeds the 15 percent emergency threshold.³¹⁵ Admission trends for malnourished children increased by 11 percent for severe acute malnutrition and by 9 percent for moderate acute malnutrition from January to September 2025 compared with the same period in 2024.³¹⁶ Without urgent and sustained funding, both food security and nutrition outcomes could deteriorate further.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Disseminate flood and cyclone early-warning information through radio, SMS and volunteer networks to enable relocations and safeguard food stocks and assets.
- Implement community-based preparedness actions for climate-related hazards in Cox's Bazar by pre-positioning emergency supplies, planning evacuations and facilitating access to cyclone shelters.
- Provide unconditional cash transfers to vulnerable households prior to climate shocks, to facilitate the purchase of food, water and essential items.

Emergency response

The Bangladesh 2025 Joint Response Plan calls for USD 287.1 million for food security and livelihoods and USD 44.9 million for nutrition interventions.

- Implement protection-sensitive prioritization for food assistance in the camps, shifting from blanket food assistance to a differentiated model based on assessed vulnerability.
- Continue supporting Rohingya families through environmentally sustainable home-based food production, including vegetable gardening, aquaculture, and seedling nurseries. Continue supporting host community smallholder farmers with the provision of quality agricultural inputs and climate-resilient vegetable seeds, access to finance, better market linkages and livelihood assistance through the aggregation centre model.
- Support Rohingya refugees, particularly female-headed households with innovative climate-smart and nutrition-sensitive agricultural practices on reduced land, such as vertical farming, rooftop or multilevel gardening, and hydroponics, to ensure continued access to additional fresh nutritious food, prevent negative coping strategies and reduce the risk of relapse into child malnutrition after treatment.

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTD.)

Other actions

- Explore market-oriented food assistance in refugee camps to enhance efficacy and sustenance of food supply.
- Document and promote the food and nutrition resilience impacts of the interventions in both host communities and refugee camps.
- Strengthen coordination among United Nations agencies – particularly the International Organization for Migration, the UN Refugee Agency, the United Nations Children's Fund and WFP – with a focus on joint prioritization.
- Diversify funding base, including exploring opportunities for in-kind contributions, such as rice, oil and beans.
- Promote common United Nations services such as fleet and office facilities management, logistics and warehousing to maximize cost efficiency across humanitarian operations.



East Africa

South Sudan

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, flooding, macroeconomic challenges

Acute food insecurity is expected to remain extremely severe during the outlook period, driven by persistent conflict, recurrent flooding and economic shocks, and very high access constraints.³¹⁷

Escalating clashes are expected to intensify, driving additional displacement and further disrupting livelihoods, with nearly 2 million people already internally displaced.³¹⁸ The continued arrival of refugees and returnees fleeing the conflict in the Sudan will add pressure, while humanitarian access to affected populations remains severely constrained.^{319, 320} Tensions and a possible escalation in conflict in Tambura County in Western Equatoria risk impacting agricultural production in parts of South Sudan's main bread basket due to displacement.³²¹

Climate shocks will compound these pressures. Above-average rains have exacerbated floods along the Nile River and its tributaries,³²² with about 927 000 people affected since July across multiple states,³²³ and up to 1.6 million at risk as floodwaters peak between September and December. Stagnant water, limited access to safe drinking water and poor sanitation are increasing health risks, while South Sudan is already at the epicentre of a cholera crisis affecting Southern and Eastern Africa. Meanwhile, rainfall deficits in eastern areas, particularly Upper Nile, are expected to reduce cereal production and result in localized losses, though abundant August rains and above-average rainfall forecasts through October may allow partial recovery.³²⁴

Economic conditions are deteriorating. Although oil exports have gradually resumed, revenues remain disrupted by liquidity constraints.³²⁵ Recent drone strikes on the Heglig hub – a critical transit point for South Sudan oil – underscore risks to trade flows and economic losses.³²⁶ GDP is projected to contract by more than 30 percent in 2025, while inflation is projected at around 66 percent,³²⁷ with staple food prices having increased nearly sevenfold since the onset of the Sudan crisis.³²⁸

From April to July 2025, 7.7 million people (57 percent of the population) faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2.4 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and

83 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), of whom 39 000 were returnees from the Sudan. The risk of Famine was reported in Luakpiny/Nasir and Ulang (Upper Nile) in the worst-case scenario.^{329, 330} Malnutrition is alarming, with 38 of the 80 counties above 15 percent and 4 at extremely Critical levels (IPC AMN Phase 5). A cholera outbreak ongoing since September 2024 has caused 94 581 cases and 1 565 deaths from January to October 2025.³³¹ Around 2.3 million children under 5 years of age are acutely malnourished, including 714 000 severely, alongside 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women who require treatment.³³² Persistent funding gaps are worsening the crisis.³³³

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Disseminate tailored early warnings and advisories to communities ahead of forecast drought and floods, to enable protective actions that safeguard lives and livelihoods, and distribute flood-proof storage systems to protect valuables and agricultural assets.
- Provide livestock vaccination and prophylactic treatments to prevent flood-related livestock diseases, particularly anthrax, which poses risks to both animals and humans.

Emergency response

The South Sudan 2025 HNRP calls for USD 475.1 million for food security and livelihoods and USD 198.4 million for nutrition interventions.³³⁴

- Scale up life-saving food assistance to populations facing Emergency or Catastrophe levels of acute food insecurity, or at risk of Famine. Priority should be given to conflict- and flood-affected populations, IDPs and communities in Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity and Greater Pibor Administrative Area, as well as newly arrived refugees and returnees from the Sudan.
- Expand nutrition assistance to women and children in areas with high malnutrition rates, integrated with WASH, health and protection interventions (including gender-based violence prevention).

Other actions

- Advocate for a cessation of hostilities and peace in South Sudan. Ensure that emergency response and anticipatory actions strengthen local capacities for peace and build trust, contributing to peacebuilding.
- Advocate for and negotiate humanitarian access in conflict-affected areas and counties at risk of Famine, including unimpeded supply corridors for the movement of essential goods and personnel – enabling civilians to receive aid and services, and humanitarian agencies to operate freely and safely.



East Africa

Somalia

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: below-average rains, conflict

Ongoing drought and conflict, coupled with forecasts of another below-average October–December *Deyr* season, are expected to drive a substantial deterioration in acute food insecurity in early 2026.

Recent poor seasons³³⁵ include the 2024 *Deyr*, with rainfall deficits across the country,³³⁶ and the March–May 2025 *Gu*, with near-record deficits in northern Somalia.^{337, 338} Deteriorating pastoral conditions have prompted widespread livestock migration across northern and central zones,^{339, 340} and a drought emergency was declared on 22 July 2025.

Forecasts indicate an increased probability of another below-average 2025 *Deyr* across southern, central and northwestern regions.³⁴¹ Poor rains are likely to impact agricultural and pastoral livelihoods, intensify resource conflicts, trigger new displacements and drive up food prices.³⁴² Consecutive poor seasons have historically led to sharp acute food security deteriorations: two failed seasons contributed to the 2011 famine, while multiple below-average seasons in 2016–2018 and 2020–2023 created famine risks.^{343, 344, 345, 346, 347}

Armed violence intensified in southern and central regions from February 2025, while political tensions escalated in

Jubaland and Puntland.³⁴⁸ Electoral disputes over the 2026 elections add further pressure.³⁴⁹ From January to August 2025, 273 000 new displacements occurred, with 60 percent driven from conflict.³⁵⁰

Reduced funding continues to constrain humanitarian response.³⁵¹ Over 300 nutrition centres have closed.³⁵² Very high access constraints will also continue to affect aid delivery,³⁵³ with women and girls bearing the heaviest burden.³⁵⁴ Lost access to health and nutrition programmes is expected to increase maternal and child mortality, acute watery diarrhoea and cholera cases, and preventable deaths.³⁵⁵

By December 2025, 4.4 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 921 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).³⁵⁶ A year-on-year surge of about 12 percent in global acute malnutrition prevalence is rapidly worsening life-threatening conditions for young children. Approximately 1.85 million children under 5 years of age face acute malnutrition, including 421 000 severely malnourished, between July 2025 and June 2026.³⁵⁷ Acute food insecurity is expected to peak during the January–June 2026 lean season.³⁵⁸



RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Disseminate early-warning information and advisories to enable communities to safeguard livelihoods, food security and nutrition, ahead of forecast drier-than-average conditions.
- Safeguard livestock productivity through fodder conservation, expanding irrigated fodder production and increasing water availability.
- Provide cash+ and multipurpose cash transfers to vulnerable households, to support food access, safeguard assets and meet essential needs in priority drought-risk areas.
- Scale up cash-for-work programmes to facilitate climate-adaptive rehabilitation of critical infrastructure ahead of forecast dry conditions.

Emergency response

The Somalia 2025 HNRP calls for USD 515 million for food security and livelihoods interventions and USD 117 million for nutrition.³⁵⁹

- Scale up life-saving food assistance, prioritizing populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), populations in northern Somalia affected by severe drought, and other at-risk populations, including IDPs.

- Scale up nutrition assistance to pregnant and breastfeeding mothers and children, in areas with high malnutrition rates, integrating WASH and health partners.
- Strengthen animal health services in drought-affected areas through enhanced surveillance, vaccination, treatment and voucher-based treatments.
- Develop alternative livelihood opportunities, particularly for women remaining behind during drought-induced migration, through microgardening kits with climate-smart, drought-resistant and early-maturing seeds, tools and training.

Other actions

- Scale up the national Safety Net for Human Capital Development Project (Baxnaano) to protect at-risk populations from further acute food insecurity, malnutrition and displacement.
- Maintain and expand school meal programmes to improve child health and nutrition, keep children in school and provide a safety net for vulnerable households.
- Expand resilience programming, including nutrition-sensitive agriculture and cash+ interventions.
- Scale up livelihoods support, targeting the most severely food-insecure people, to protect households and food sources and reduce future needs.



East Africa

Kenya

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: below-average rains, high food prices

Forecasts of below-average October–December 2025 rainfall, together with localized conflict and high food prices, are expected to drive a deterioration of the acute food insecurity situation in early 2026.

Forecasts indicate an elevated probability of below-average rains during the 2025 short rains across Kenya,³⁶⁰ with eastern areas facing the highest risk. Northern and eastern pastoral areas, along with southeastern cropping areas, are expected to be the most affected, with below-average crop and livestock production reducing food and income.³⁶¹

These forecasts follow a mixed recent seasonal performance that has already strained agricultural systems. The 2024 short rains were below average in many areas, particularly the northeast.³⁶² The 2025 long rains recorded average to above-average totals but were poorly distributed, causing significantly below-average crop production in agropastoral and marginal agricultural areas. In Kitui South, Makueni East and Tharaka North, between 80 and 100 percent of crops failed.³⁶³ By late August 2025, vegetative conditions were below average, especially in eastern Kenya,³⁶⁴ with potential impact on livestock productivity.

Climate shocks coincide with resource disputes affecting pastoral communities, clan conflicts in the northeast and human–wildlife conflicts. High food prices compound these challenges,³⁶⁵ with national maize prices 15 percent above 2024 levels as of June 2025 due to reduced 2024 cereal production.³⁶⁶ Another dry season could further tighten cereal supplies in affected areas, driving additional price increases. Funding cuts in refugee camps left nearly two-thirds of households without food, and over 90 percent in Kakuma and Kalobeyei resorting to extreme coping strategies. In Dadaab, one in four children under 5 years of age is at risk of malnutrition. While food rations stabilized in the third quarter after falling to as low as 20 percent, urgent support is needed to prevent further deterioration.³⁶⁷

Between October 2025 and January 2026, 2.1 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, a two percentage point increase compared with the same period one year earlier, including

160 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).^{368, 369} The highly food-insecure population rose by 22 percent compared with a year earlier.³⁷⁰ An estimated 742 000 children under 5 years of age are expected to be acutely malnourished between April 2025 and March 2026, including 179 000 severely so. More than 109 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women will also be acutely malnourished.^{371, 372} Beyond the end of the IPC analysis period (January 2026), the impact of another below-average season on acute food security is expected to be most evident between March and May 2026.³⁷³

RECOMMENDATIONS**Anticipatory actions**

- Disseminate early-warning information and advisories to inform communities living in arid and semi-arid lands on drought risk management to protect their livelihoods, food security and nutrition.
- Support rangeland management activities to mitigate the forecasted impact of drought on livestock production and productivity in arid and semi-arid lands.
- Provide multipurpose cash transfers to vulnerable households in arid and semi-arid lands to stabilize their purchasing power, enable access to nutritious food and address their essential needs ahead of the forecasted drought. In addition, provide cash top-ups to households with vulnerable children under 2 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women and girls.

Emergency response

- Sustain life-saving food and nutrition interventions (including cash-based assistance) to meet immediate food and nutrition needs, prioritizing highly food-insecure refugees in camps and acutely food-insecure populations in arid and semi-arid lands affected by drought and dry spells.
- Strengthen animal health services for vulnerable herders and livestock-dependent communities in at-risk areas, particularly in the east, by enhancing

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

- surveillance, providing vaccinations and implementing voucher-based treatments to protect livestock, sustain livelihoods and support daily nutrition.
- Support breeding and milking herds that remain during transhumance movements, ensuring continued household milk supply through supplementary feeding and unconditional cash transfers.
- Provide collapsible water tanks for transhumant livestock, to facilitate water-trucking operations, reduce waiting times and improve distribution efficiency as drought-related water shortages intensify.

Other actions

- Strengthen coordination, planning and implementation of drought anticipatory actions through integrated, joint frameworks.
- Build social cohesion to reduce expected increases in tension over dwindling common resources such as water and pasture.
- Support national social protection systems, including Kenya's Hunger Safety Net Programme, to mitigate drought impact on the most vulnerable people.
- Support conflict-sensitive advisories and programming aimed at reducing resource-based tension and conflict.



Latin America and the Caribbean

Haiti

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: gang violence, economic crisis, floods

Expanding gang violence, the protracted economic crisis and flooding are expected to further undermine livelihoods, agricultural production and access to food. Combined with significant funding gaps,³⁷⁴ these pressures could result in a deterioration of already critical levels of acute food insecurity over the outlook period.

An expansion of gang territorial control into the previously less-affected Centre and North departments triggered the declaration of a three-month state of emergency in August,^{375, 376} raising risks of wider violence.³⁷⁷ This is likely to further drive additional internal displacement, reducing land access and food production, straining IDPs' access to livelihoods, and food and clean water, amid the spread of cholera.³⁷⁸ Internal displacement reached a record 1.4 million people in June 2025, a 36 percent increase compared to December 2024, mainly in rural areas.³⁷⁹ Forced returns,³⁸⁰ also on the rise,³⁸¹ are pressuring already limited host community resources.

Widespread violence continues to constrain private consumption and investment, with the economy projected to contract in 2025 for the seventh consecutive year.³⁸² Insecurity-related supply chain disruptions and reduced market supplies have driven sharp food price increases: annual food inflation has been rising since April and reached 35.1 percent in September 2025,³⁸³ with headline inflation expected to remain above 2024 levels.³⁸⁴ In parallel, reduced humanitarian assistance and remittances are expected to further deteriorate livelihoods.^{385, 386}

Cereal production in 2025 is expected to be below average, reflecting limited access to land and agricultural inputs, as well as the impact of displacement and roadblocks. Dry conditions between May and July reduced yields of the main season maize and paddy crops.^{387, 388, 389} While forecasts of average to above-average rainfall in late 2025 and early 2026³⁹⁰ may benefit remaining minor seasons to be harvested in November and March, heavy rainfall since the end of September caused flooding in several departments, damaging crops and sweeping away livestock.³⁹¹ The acute food security situation is projected to be further exacerbated by heavy rains and floods caused by Hurricane Melissa, which formed in end-October.^{392, 393}

Between March and June 2026, more than 5.9 million people (53 percent of the analysed population) are projected to face

Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) – the highest number since IPC analyses began in Haiti in 2013. This includes 2 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).^{394, 395} In addition, over 288 000 children are expected to be acutely malnourished in 2025, a 4 percent increase from 2024.³⁹⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Disseminate early-warning messages with tailored advice on how to protect lives, livelihoods and food security ahead of forecast flood risks.
- Provide cash transfers (including through social protection systems) when flood early-warning triggers are reached, targeting the most vulnerable and at-risk populations.³⁹⁷
- Support early harvest and protect assets, including through distribution of waterproof silos, seed protection bags, animal shelters, and securing fishing boats and gear in safe spaces.

Emergency response

The Haiti 2025 HNRP calls for USD 425 million for food security interventions and USD 39.9 million for nutrition.³⁹⁸

- Provide emergency food and nutrition to affected populations, including IDPs, with particular emphasis on women, children and at-risk groups, to increase food availability and access.
- Support emergency food production by scaling up distribution of quality seeds, tools, small livestock and fishery kits, complemented by cash distributions, to boost food availability and access, while promoting local procurement.
- Provide livelihood and job opportunities outside Port-au-Prince to allow sustainable, voluntary, safe and dignified relocation schemes for IDPs and other people affected by gang violence outside Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, coupled with reintegration support into rural livelihood systems and social and economic participation.

Near East and North Africa

Sudan

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic crisis, floods

Famine conditions were expected to continue in the Sudan through September according to the IPC Alert from July 2025,³⁹⁹ particularly affecting communities exposed to conflict, displacement and reduced mobility. For the outlook period of this report, key drivers are unlikely to improve in conflict-affected areas, as violence escalates across Kordofan and Northern Darfur,⁴⁰⁰ driving displacement, disruptions and heightened risk of worsening acute food insecurity.

Conflict is expected to continue escalating in the famine-affected areas across Kordofan and Northern Darfur, the epicentres of violence and tightening sieges on regional capitals.^{401, 402} Displacements will increase, adding to the over 9.8 million IDPs as of mid-September 2025, including 7.4 million IDPs displaced since April 2023. Approximately, over 4.3 million have fled to neighbouring countries since April 2023.⁴⁰³

Violence will further drive the economic crisis, with inflation projected above 60 percent in 2026.⁴⁰⁴ The local currency depreciated by 31 percent year on year in the parallel market as of July 2025, while the cost of a basket of essential food items doubled.⁴⁰⁵ In El Fasher, located in North Darfur State, prices of sorghum and millet skyrocketed between June and September, increasing more than twentyfold, due to heightened violence and the besiegement of the city.⁴⁰⁶

Infrastructure damage, input shortages and widespread floods are likely to affect cereal production.⁴⁰⁷ After dry conditions in June affected millet and sorghum crops, for harvest in October–December, average to above-average rains between July and mid-September⁴⁰⁸ improved vegetation in many areas – though some crop damage was irreversible and vegetation in the southeast remained below average.⁴⁰⁹ Heavy rains also caused localized floods and crop losses. Weather forecasts point to the continuation of above-average rains through October,⁴¹⁰ heightening flood risks and contributing to the further spread of diseases, including cholera.⁴¹¹ Economic collapse has further limited the benefits of improved security in key producing areas such as Al Jazirah and Sennar states.⁴¹²

Through May 2025, around 24.6 million people were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 8 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 637 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).^{413,*} The IPC Famine Review Committee detected Famine in late 2024 in five camps in North Darfur and parts of South and West Kordofan, projecting expansion to five additional areas in North Darfur by May 2025, with 17 other areas across Darfur and the Central Nuba Mountains facing a risk of Famine.^{414,*} Acute food insecurity was expected to further worsen during the July–September 2025 lean season.⁴¹⁵ Since May 2025, market disruptions have increased, with access remaining extremely constrained.^{416, 417}

In the coming months, intense fighting in North Darfur is likely to continue undermining food availability and access,^{418, 419} while severe funding cuts will exacerbate constraints on delivering life-saving assistance.⁴²⁰ Acute malnutrition will also remain dire, with 60 percent of areas assessed in 2025 reporting very high global acute malnutrition prevalence (>15 percent), reaching 34 percent in Melit in North Darfur.^{421, 422} Additionally, despite the substantial scale-up of humanitarian assistance in August 2025 in areas facing the highest levels of food insecurity – including those classified as experiencing or at risk of famine – critical food and nutrition programmes and emergency agricultural assistance continue to face the most severe funding shortfalls, placing millions at heightened risk of hunger and malnutrition.⁴²³

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Sudan 2025 HNRP calls for USD 1.5 billion for food security and livelihoods and USD 471.7 million for nutrition interventions.⁴²⁴

- Continue scaling up life-saving food and nutrition assistance to the most acutely food-insecure populations, prioritizing areas confirmed as Famine,

* The Government of the Sudan did not endorse the December 2024 IPC analysis results.

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

at risk of Famine, populations facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), besieged areas, and those affected by conflict and flooding, including highly food-insecure IDPs and refugees.

- Provide livelihood support by: distributing climate-resilient seeds, tools, fertilizers and fishing gear; rehabilitating cold chain and processing facilities; and safeguarding agropastoral livelihoods through emergency feed and fodder, animal health and nutrition packages, market-based offtake, emergency slaughter and targeted restocking of small livestock.

- Continue scaling up voucher transfers to improve access to food, basic services, community assets, agrarian infrastructure and irrigation systems.

Other actions

- Advocate for safe, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access, particularly in areas facing or at risk of Famine.
- Provide school meals to increase school enrolment, relieve hunger and support learning, sourcing food from Sudanese smallholder farmers where possible to strengthen local agriculture.



Near East and North Africa

Palestine

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic collapse

Despite a partial resumption of humanitarian assistance since the ceasefire agreement reached in mid-October, needs in the Gaza Strip remain critical and largely unmet. Catastrophic food security levels are likely to persist if the restoration of aid and commercial flows remains partial. Conditions in the West Bank are worsening amid intensifying military operations, demolitions, displacement, movement restrictions and settler violence.

Following the ceasefire announcement in mid-October, the entry of food, animal feed and other essential supplies through humanitarian and private sector channels has increased, allowing some improvements in food security. As a result, the average number of meals consumed per day increased from one in August to two in October. At the time of writing, humanitarian needs across Gaza remain largely unmet as people continue to face acute shortages of food and household purchasing power continues to be challenged given unaffordable prices and lack of access to livelihoods. The ceasefire has opened a window of opportunity to rehabilitate agricultural land and infrastructure.⁴²⁵

Famine was confirmed in the Gaza Governorate as of 15 August 2025 and was projected to expand to Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis by end-September,⁴²⁶ while conditions in North Gaza governorate were estimated to be equally dire or worse.^{427, 428} Nearly 641 000 people – almost one-third of the population – were expected to face Catastrophe conditions (IPC Phase 5), while 1.14 million were projected in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).⁴²⁹ At least 132 000 children under 5 years of age were expected to suffer from acute malnutrition through June 2026, including 41 000 severe cases at heightened risk of death.⁴³⁰ At the time of the Famine Review Committee analysis, about 86 percent of the Gaza Strip was within militarized areas or under displacement orders,⁴³¹ with displaced people mostly concentrated in areas far from food or aid, often after multiple displacements.⁴³² Damaged cropland had increased by 117 hectares since the previous assessment on 28 July.⁴³³

In the **West Bank**, conditions are rapidly worsening amid intensifying military operations, settlement expansions and demolitions, settler violence, movement restrictions and economic decline. Agricultural households are increasingly exposed to acute shocks to their livelihoods. Eighty-seven

percent reported experiencing at least one shock, with over 40 percent reporting exposure to violence or conflict, 26 percent movement restrictions, and others reporting job loss or rising food, fuel and transportation costs.^{434, 435, 436, 437} New settlement plans will further disrupt livelihoods, cut off northern and central areas from the south, and deepen East Jerusalem's isolation.^{438, 439} Falling incomes, asset sales and reliance on borrowing signal eroding resilience and growing acute food insecurity.^{440, 441}

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2025 Flash Appeal for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, covering Gaza and the West Bank, calls for USD 1.3 billion for food security and livelihoods interventions, including USD 203 million for nutrition.^{442, 443}

- Advocate for safe, sustained humanitarian access across the Gaza Strip to enable large-scale delivery of food, nutrition and agricultural production inputs.
- Provide food and nutrition assistance through diverse modalities (in-kind, cash-based, bread, cooked meals, fresh produce), delivered safely and in partnership with community-led initiatives and the private sector.
- Scale up cash assistance to help households, including farmers, herders and fishers meet immediate needs and restore agriculture-based livelihoods and local food production in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.
- Expand supplementary feeding and infant and young child feeding programmes to prevent and treat acute malnutrition.
- Cash assistance can complement in-kind support to ensure more access to food diversity, to ensure access to essential agricultural inputs, promote farm and fishing boat rehabilitation, support sustainable recovery, and prevent a massive increase in aid dependency as soon as aid resumes at scale.
- Secure access to agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers, greenhouse plastic sheets, propagation materials, animal feed, animal sheds, vaccines, water tanks) through in-kind and cash assistance in the West Bank and in Gaza

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

as soon as access allows, to support food production and livestock survival.

- Facilitate fuel and cooking gas entry to sustain humanitarian operations and keep essential services functioning, supporting market reopening and food access.
- Support restoration of critical infrastructure for irrigation, safe drinking water and functional sanitation facilities.

Other actions

- We urge all parties to the conflict to commit to a sustained and permanent ceasefire and to fully respect International Humanitarian Law, as essential steps to enable unhindered, large-scale humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians.
- Integrate agriculture-based assistance into broader humanitarian planning and food security assessments for coordinated, effective response.



Near East and North Africa

Yemen

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: economic deterioration, conflict, climatic shocks

The already critical acute food insecurity situation is expected to deteriorate further over the outlook period, with pockets of the population projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in four districts of Amran, Al Hodeidah and Hajjah governorates.⁴⁴⁴

The crisis is driven by economic deterioration, escalating conflict, economic sanctions,⁴⁴⁵ adverse weather conditions, population displacement and disrupted supply chains that restrict market access, amid extreme humanitarian access constraints and the collapse of safety nets.

Ongoing conflict across the Sana'a-Based Authorities-controlled areas and in the Red Sea is deepening the economic decline and triggering new displacements.⁴⁴⁶ Attacks have damaged critical infrastructure such as airports and seaports, while security along the frontline remains fragile. Fuel imports through Red Sea ports in July dropped to their lowest levels in three years due to infrastructure damage, with a likely inflationary impact on food prices.⁴⁴⁷ Already extreme humanitarian access constraints⁴⁴⁸ have resulted in curtailed humanitarian assistance, and are compounded by funding cuts and economic sanctions, significantly curtailing response capacity.⁴⁴⁹

The economic crisis will continue to constrain livelihood opportunities and limit access to basic needs. The GDP is projected to contract by 0.5 percent in 2025.⁴⁵⁰ Despite currency appreciation in July–August leading to a 12 percent decline in the cost of the minimum food basket year on year in August⁴⁵¹ in the Internationally Recognized Government areas,⁴⁵² inflation is likely to remain high. Additionally, funding constraints are expected to result in a drastic reduction of emergency assistance from January 2026 onwards.⁴⁵³ In the Internationally Recognized Government areas, the Houthi blockade on oil exports and fuel shortages will strain public finances. Areas controlled by Sana'a-Based Authorities face acute liquidity shortages, while external shocks, including the conflict, reduced aid and economic sanctions, are set to deepen the fragile economic crisis.⁴⁵⁴

Agricultural production faced climatic shocks, with early-season dryness followed by heavy rains during the main Kharif season starting in August 2025.⁴⁵⁵ Flooding from August through September damaged irrigation infrastructure and drinking water wells, particularly in Lahij, Ta'iz and Ma'rib governorates, reducing livelihoods and increasing risks of waterborne diseases, such as cholera.⁴⁵⁶ As of August 2025, over 330 000 suspected cases have been reported in Yemen, which bears the third highest burden globally. The outbreak is disproportionately affecting districts with high levels of

malnutrition.⁴⁵⁷ Limited input availability and climatic shocks are expected to result in a below-average 2025 cereal harvest, undermining agricultural livelihoods.⁴⁵⁸

Over half of Yemen's population is expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity between September 2025 and February 2026. About 18.1 million people are expected to face Crisis or worse acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 5.5 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across the country. More than 41 000 people are projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Sana'a-Based Authorities-controlled areas. In 2025, 24 districts are expected to face very high levels of acute malnutrition, particularly in Ta'iz and Al Jawf governorates.^{459, 460} Out of the total districts classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4), 72 percent also have Nutrition Severity Level 4 or above.⁴⁶¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Yemen 2025 HNRP calls for USD 1.1 billion for food security and livelihood interventions and USD 237.9 million for nutrition interventions.⁴⁶²

- Implement targeted emergency food and nutrition assistance to prevent the most severe outcomes of acute food insecurity and malnutrition, aligned with reprioritized targets under the 2025 HNRP.
- Support livelihood protection and production through distribution of agricultural inputs (crop seeds, vegetable seeds, hand tools, fertilizer), fishing packages (hooks, lines, nets, cool boxes), livestock production (small ruminants, mineral blocks, feed concentrate) and poultry-production packages (chickens, feed, equipment), paired with cash assistance to protect the livelihoods of livestock-keeping households.

Other actions

- Exert maximum pressure for the release of unlawfully detained United Nations staff in Sana'a-Based Authorities-controlled areas.
- Advocate for safe and continuous humanitarian access to food-insecure populations, particularly across the north of the country.
- Strengthen operational preparedness for potential conflict-escalation scenarios, including both first-line rapid response mechanisms and second-line food security responses.

Near East and North Africa

Syrian Arab Republic

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: extreme drought, localized violence, economic deterioration

Already severe levels of acute food insecurity are expected to deteriorate further during the outlook period, driven by severe drought, prolonged localized violence, economic fragility and critical funding gaps, amid a fragile political transition and high access constraints.

Agricultural production has been severely affected by damaged infrastructure, restricted access to land due to explosive devices and high displacement.⁴⁶³ The 2025 drought, the most intense countrywide in decades,^{464, 465} devastated crop yields, reduced summer cropping areas, increased water shortages and deteriorated pastures, doubling fodder prices. Livestock health and nutrition have declined, reducing dairy production,⁴⁶⁶ while market prices rose, constraining household food availability, particularly in the south.⁴⁶⁷ Forecasts indicate below-average rainfall in the upcoming season, which could further intensify acute food insecurity.⁴⁶⁸

Instability will continue to drive displacement, disrupt access to services and challenge humanitarian operations.⁴⁶⁹ Over 1.14 million people have returned to areas of origin since December 2024, but damaged infrastructure, insecurity and limited services hinder sustainable reintegration and livelihood recovery.^{470, 471} While international sanctions have been removed,⁴⁷² the protracted economic crisis, with oil import shortages, currency depreciation and insufficient liquidity,⁴⁷³ keeps purchasing power critically low. As of June 2025, the minimum wage covered only one-third of food needs.^{474, 475}

Approximately 9.1 million people faced acute food insecurity in August–October 2024, including 1.4 million in severe food insecurity based on WFP's CARI methodology, with an additional 5.4 million at risk.^{476, 477} The situation has worsened since December 2024, and funding shortfalls are expected to further limit humanitarian reach.⁴⁷⁸

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Safeguard wheat and crop production by providing drought-tolerant and short-cycle seeds, fertilizer and fuel ahead of the planting season, to mitigate forecast drought impact.

Emergency response

The Syrian Arab Republic 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan calls for USD 856.4 million for food security and agriculture interventions and USD 164.8 million for nutrition interventions.⁴⁷⁹

- Implement supplementary nutrition interventions for children, pregnant and breastfeeding women and girls, alongside treatment for moderately malnourished children.
- Supply emergency agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers, fuel, tools, animal feed, vaccines) and support farming, livestock and fisheries to sustain food production in drought-affected areas, particularly in coastal, central, southern and northwestern areas.
- Rehabilitate key infrastructure, including irrigation and the wheat/bread value chain, and support bakeries with raw materials and flour fortification.

Other actions

- Advocate for safe, inclusive and unhindered access to food for the most vulnerable, ensuring humanitarian assistance is not obstructed by political or economic barriers.
- Invest in timely, evidence-based data and agroecological analysis to close gaps, guide response and update strategies for returnees.
- Maximize participatory approaches with rural farming communities to enhance resilience through anticipatory actions, climate-smart agricultural and sustainable natural resource management.
- Rehabilitate and maintain destroyed or dilapidated agricultural infrastructure, including irrigation canals, water pumping stations, veterinary centres and general agricultural services.

Southern Africa

Democratic Republic of the Congo

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, floods

Critical levels of acute food insecurity are expected to persist, driven by conflict in eastern provinces and flooding,⁴⁸⁰ compounded by funding shortfalls.⁴⁸¹

The resurgence of armed groups and intensified conflict since January 2025 has caused widespread displacement, market collapse and restricted humanitarian access.^{482, 483} By July 2025, over 5.8 million people remained displaced and 3.8 million had returned, with a rise in forced returns and attacks on displacement camps,^{484, 485, 486} placing the Democratic Republic of the Congo among the largest internal displacement crises globally.⁴⁸⁷ Agricultural production was constrained between January and April in conflict-affected areas, affecting food security through the end of 2025.⁴⁸⁸ Persistent attacks on humanitarian personnel continue to limit operational access.^{489, 490}

Severe flooding in Kinshasa region in April destroyed livelihoods and farmland, resulting in significant losses of maize, a critical crop.⁴⁹¹ Ongoing floods continue to disrupt agricultural activities, limiting access to inputs and markets. Inflation and supply chain disruptions have pushed maize flour

prices above pre-conflict levels, further eroding household purchasing power.⁴⁹² Food security interventions also remain critically underfunded.⁴⁹³

Over 27.7 million people (24 percent of the analysed population) were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between January and June 2025, including nearly 3.9 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Eastern provinces – North and South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika – host 10.3 million people (39 percent of the total provincial population) in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).⁴⁹⁴ Malnutrition remains rampant, with 4.5 million children under 5 years of age, including 1.9 million severely malnourished, and 3.7 million pregnant and breastfeeding women projected to face acute malnutrition through June 2025, placing the Democratic Republic of the Congo among the countries with the highest global acute malnutrition burdens.⁴⁹⁵ During the outlook period, the situation could worsen due to operational constraints from funding cuts and ongoing cholera, mpox and Ebola outbreaks, particularly during the October–April rainy season.⁴⁹⁶



RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide conditional and unconditional cash-based transfers and in-kind assistance to newly displaced households and those at risk of flooding, while scaling up malnutrition prevention interventions for children under 5 years of age and for pregnant and breastfeeding women.
- Distribute short-cycle seeds, farming tools and storage equipment to farmers in conflict-affected and flood-prone areas.
- Conduct awareness campaigns on flood risks and protective measures.
- Provide livestock feed and veterinary supplies in vulnerable areas, ensuring prevention and treatment of animal diseases, particularly zoonoses that affect children.

Emergency response

The Democratic Republic of the Congo 2025 HNRP calls for USD 1.1 billion for food security and livelihoods and USD 275.2 million for nutrition interventions.⁴⁹⁷

- Scale up life-saving food and nutrition assistance for populations affected by conflict, displacement, flooding, cholera and Ebola, prioritizing populations in Emergency

(IPC Phase 4) areas and other vulnerable groups, including quarantined households and frontline health workers.

- Provide livelihood support (inputs for agriculture, livestock and fisheries) to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), particularly in Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika and Kasai, to sustain local food production, stabilize food prices and mitigate acute food insecurity.
- Support households with inputs and tools for home gardening and off-season cultivation to enhance food access in areas experiencing high access constraints and market disruptions.

Other actions

- Advocate urgently with stakeholders to unlock access, including cross-border and cross-frontline movements and through humanitarian air corridors, to reach communities isolated by conflict.
- Strengthen logistics and access strategies through pre-positioning of supplies, mobile delivery models and coordination with local actors to reach high-risk and hard-to-access areas.



West Africa and the Sahel

Mali

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict

Acute food insecurity is expected to remain at critical levels during the outlook period, driven by armed conflict, access constraints and adverse weather conditions, which are likely to lead to localized crop production shortfalls.

In recent months, the conflict has spread into previously less-affected areas,^{498, 499} accompanied by an increase in high-fatality attacks, including in regions experiencing Emergency (CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, such as Mopti and Gao.⁵⁰⁰ Armed violence is likely to drive further internal displacement, which reached 402 200 people as of December 2024.^{501, 502} In addition, persistent insecurity in Burkina Faso is expected to continue prompting cross-border displacements, with over 12 000 refugees arriving in Mali during the first half of August.^{503, 504}

The intensification of insecurity is disrupting transport, local markets and fuel availability,^{505, 506} further restricting access.^{507, 508} In conflict-affected Gao, Kidal and Ménaka, the cost of the food basket in July 2025 was 118–152 percent above the national average.⁵⁰⁹ Prices are likely to remain elevated due to conflict-related market disruptions.⁵¹⁰ These challenges are compounded by significant funding shortfalls,⁵¹¹ which are undermining humanitarian operations.

As of mid-September, the agricultural season was progressing satisfactorily.^{512, 513} However, below-average rainfall is forecast through the end of the rainy season, which could negatively affect rainfed rice development.⁵¹⁴ Limited access to agricultural inputs, pest outbreaks and reduced cultivated areas in conflict-affected central and northern regions are expected to result in localized crop production shortfalls in 2025.^{515, 516}

Approximately 1.5 million people (6 percent of the population) were projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity during the June–August 2025 lean season, up from 1.4 million in the same period in 2024. This included 64 200 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) in Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal,⁵¹⁷ and 2 600 people in Ménaka at risk of Catastrophe (CH Phase 5).⁵¹⁸

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Mali 2025 HNRP calls for USD 254.9 million for food security and livelihoods and USD 71.5 million for nutrition interventions.⁵¹⁹

- Provide emergency food and nutrition assistance to vulnerable populations, including pregnant and breastfeeding women, infants and young children, in Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou, Kidal and Ménaka. Priority should be given to areas classified as being in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), with aggravating factors such as high levels of displacement.
- Provide emergency crop, livestock feed and veterinary inputs to vulnerable and internally displaced herders, to protect livestock from the impact of the pastoral lean season, drought and conflict-related displacement.
- Support households with inputs and tools for home gardening and off-season cultivation to improve food access in areas with high humanitarian access constraints and market disruptions.



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West Africa and the Sahel

Nigeria

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic challenges, dry conditions, floods

An already critical acute food insecurity situation is expected to persist during the outlook period, due to high levels of conflict in northern areas, economic challenges and adverse weather conditions, exacerbated by extreme humanitarian access constraints and critical funding shortfalls.⁵²⁰

Ongoing violence in the Northeast and Northwest regions is expected to persist at very high levels, driving further displacement beyond the nearly 3 million people already displaced in these regions, out of 3.6 million IDPs nationwide as of early September 2025.⁵²¹ Persistent high levels of violence are anticipated to continue disrupting food systems and agricultural activities,^{522, 523} severely hampering the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Between December 2024 and May 2025, humanitarian access constraints worsened from very high to extreme.⁵²⁴

Headline inflation is projected to remain in double digits for the tenth consecutive year in 2025, driven by high food prices, rising energy costs and currency instability linked to pressures on foreign reserves.^{525, 526} Funding shortfalls could further limit emergency food and nutrition assistance in the Northeast.⁵²⁷

Precipitation deficits throughout the 2025 rainy season are expected to cause cereal production shortfalls in central and northern regions, particularly in key producing Middle Belt states.^{528, 529, 530} Heavy rains have triggered floods across the country, affecting over 340 000 people and submerging cropland in localized areas, particularly in the Niger and Benue basins, as of late September.⁵³¹ Weather forecasts indicate above-average rainfall through November in central and northern areas, heightening the risk of further flooding and crop losses.⁵³² In western and southern areas, dry conditions affected planting of the second-season maize crop,^{533, 534} and below-average rainfall forecasts through November⁵³⁵ heighten the risk of reduced output.

According to the March 2025 CH analysis, over 30.6 million people (15 percent of the analysed population) were projected to face Crisis or worse acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above) in 26 states and Federal Capital Territory from June to August 2025.⁵³⁶ Of these, 15.6 million were in the conflict-affected Northwest and Northeast, which also host 1.1 million of the 1.2 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).^{537, 538}

Acute malnutrition prevalence among children under 5 years of age remains above 10 percent in several areas of Borno, Yobe, Sokoto and Katsina states.⁵³⁹ More than 5.4 million children under 5 years of age in northeast and northwest Nigeria were projected to be malnourished from May 2024 to April 2025, including about 1.8 million with severe acute malnutrition. Nearly 788 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women were projected to be acutely malnourished during the same period.⁵⁴⁰

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Nigeria 2025 HNRP calls for USD 352.2 million for food security and USD 132.1 million for nutrition interventions.⁵⁴¹

- Provide emergency food assistance and emergency agricultural inputs to populations in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above).
- Continue unconditional cash transfers, prioritizing populations in the Northeast and Northwest in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above).
- Support vulnerable farmers' livelihoods, targeting populations in Crisis and Emergency (CH Phases 3 and 4), including IDPs, host communities and local populations, through the provision of crop, livestock and fishery inputs, prevention and treatment of animal diseases (including zoonoses affecting humans, particularly children), and cash-for-work programmes to support recovery in flood- and conflict-affected areas such as Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.
- Provide life-saving prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition, alongside gender-transformative social and behaviour change interventions, for children aged 6–59 months and pregnant and breastfeeding women in crisis-prone and conflict-affected areas.

West Africa and the Sahel

Burkina Faso

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, high food prices

Sustained conflict, very high humanitarian access constraints,⁵⁴² widespread displacement, elevated food prices and the risk of localized flooding are likely to drive high levels of acute food insecurity during the outlook period.

Conflict continues to affect large parts of the country, particularly in northern and eastern areas.⁵⁴³ Insecurity significantly constrains market supply deliveries and humanitarian access, especially in enclaved and hard-to-reach areas, including Sebba, Djibo, Arbinda, Gayéri, Foutouri, Bogandé and Diapaga.^{544, 545} Humanitarian needs in these enclaved localities are likely underestimated, owing to information gaps caused by access constraints and underreporting.⁵⁴⁶ Limited humanitarian assistance due to severe funding shortfalls⁵⁴⁷ has prevented a consistent response. In the absence of updated data, the most recent figures from March 2023 report nearly 2.1 million IDPs, with about one quarter located in the Liptako and Soum region.⁵⁴⁸ As of July 2025, the same region hosted about two-thirds of the 42 000 refugees and asylum seekers, mostly from Mali.⁵⁴⁹ Access to humanitarian assistance and basic services in Liptako and Soum remains particularly limited for displaced populations due to bureaucratic impediments.⁵⁵⁰

Conflict-related market disruptions, restricted cross-border trade and high transport costs are expected to sustain elevated food prices. In July 2025, cereal prices ranged 15–30 percent above the five-year average in most markets and nearly doubled in several insecure localities, including Sebba and Gayéri.⁵⁵¹

Agricultural activities remain disrupted by insecurity,⁵⁵² resulting in localized crop production shortfalls in 2025. As of mid-August 2025, vegetation conditions were below average in southern and eastern areas.⁵⁵³ Forecast average to above-average rainfall until October⁵⁵⁴ may support crop recovery but also increases the risk of localized flooding.

As per the latest available CH analysis of March 2024, 2.7 million people (12 percent of the population) faced Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between June and August 2024, including over 423 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).⁵⁵⁵

Acute malnutrition affected about 426 000 children under 5 years of age and over 40 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women from August 2024 to July 2025, with critical acute malnutrition (IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 4) conditions reported in Yalgo (Namentenga), Dori (Séno) and Gorom-Gorom (Oudalan) regions.⁵⁵⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Burkina Faso 2025 HNRP calls for USD 273.1 million for food security and livelihoods and USD 53.3 million for nutrition interventions.⁵⁵⁷

- Provide emergency food and nutrition assistance to populations in Crisis and Emergency (CH Phases 3 and 4), with priority for Liptako, Soum, Kuilsé, Bankui, Yaadga, Nakambé, Goulmou and eastern provinces.
- Provide emergency crop, livestock and fishery inputs to populations in Crisis and Emergency (CH Phases 3 and 4), including IDPs, host communities, returnees and local populations in Liptako, Soum, Kuilsé, Bankui, Yaadga, Nakambé and Goulmou.
- Support households with access to irrigable land by providing inputs and tools for home gardening, to improve access to nutritious food.

Other actions

- Pre-position and distribute food and non-food items in hard-to-reach areas, including Djibo, Arbinda, Sebba, Gayéri, Foutouri, Bogandé, Bourzanga, Pensa, Barsalgho, Titao, Tougouri, Boala, Pibaoré, Dargo and Diapaga, to mitigate the impact of delayed humanitarian access and reduce risks associated with crop failures.

West Africa and the Sahel

Chad

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: cross-border arrivals, conflict, macroeconomic challenges

Critical levels of acute food insecurity are expected to persist due to a sustained influx of people fleeing conflict in the Sudan, internal insecurity, livelihood erosion and flood risks.

With the conflict in the Sudan expected to escalate, the arrival of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees – estimated at 877 000 and 313 000 respectively as of August 2025, mostly hosted in eastern Chad – is likely to continue.⁵⁵⁸ By September, Chad's total refugee population reached nearly 1.5 million – a 149 percent increase since the outbreak of the conflict in the Sudan in mid-April 2023, and a 14 percent rise since the end of 2024.⁵⁵⁹ New arrivals are intensifying pressure on scarce resources and livelihoods, deepening local vulnerabilities.⁵⁶⁰

Insecurity is expected to persist in the Lac region, disrupting livelihoods and trade, and adding to the 226 000 IDPs as of May 2025.^{561, 562, 563} In the south, intercommunal conflicts are likely to continue, causing loss of life, crop and livestock losses, and displacement.⁵⁶⁴ Funding cuts have reduced humanitarian assistance, further limiting food access in conflict-affected areas.^{565, 566}

Despite deflation between March and July 2025,⁵⁶⁷ household purchasing power remains weak due to continued climate-related shocks and livelihood erosion.⁵⁶⁸ Food prices may rise slightly as a result of conflict, flood-related market disruptions and high transport costs, further limiting access to food.⁵⁶⁹

A late rainy season affected planting and crop development in 2025, while dry spells in the south contributed to poor vegetation conditions as of end-September.⁵⁷⁰ Forecast above-average rainfall through October may support crop recovery and yields but also raises localized flood risks and access challenges.⁵⁷¹ Flooding may also increase disease risks, with cholera cases and related deaths already reported in the Dougui camp, Ouaddaï.⁵⁷²

Over 3.3 million Chadian residents (19 percent of the population) faced Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between June and August 2025, including 289 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).⁵⁷³ In addition, more than 456 000 refugees, returnees and IDPs (28 percent of the analysed population) faced high levels

of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above), with nearly 80 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4).⁵⁷⁴ Over 2 million children under 5 years of age were acutely malnourished, including 537 000 severely malnourished cases between October 2024 and September 2025. This figure included about 90 000 refugees, 28 000 IDPs and 42 000 returnees. Over 297 000 pregnant or breastfeeding women were also expected to suffer acute malnutrition during the same period.⁵⁷⁵

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute Purdue Improved Crop Storage bags and plastic airtight drums for secure storage of food, seeds and essential household items, coupled with awareness-raising on proper use and flood-risk protection measures.
- Provide conditional transfers to reinforce dikes and riverbanks and improve drainage systems.
- Provide livestock feed and veterinary inputs to protect herders' livelihoods and reduce displacement risks in the Lac region and southern areas.

Emergency response

The Chad 2025 HNRP calls for USD 286.9 million for food security and livelihoods and USD 151.3 million for nutrition interventions.⁵⁷⁶

- Provide emergency food assistance to populations in Crisis and Emergency (CH Phases 3 and 4), particularly refugees, returnees and host communities in the eastern and Lac regions, while promoting access to nutritious and affordable diets and essential services for pregnant and breastfeeding women, infants and young children to address acute food insecurity and malnutrition.
- Implement cash-for-work programmes to rehabilitate community assets and provide agricultural inputs to restore livelihoods in flood- and conflict-affected regions, including Ouaddaï, Wadi Fira and Lac.
- Ensure prevention and treatment of livestock diseases, with particular focus on zoonoses that also threaten human health, especially among children.

Glossary

IPC/CH PHASE 5 EXPLAINED

Catastrophe and Famine both refer to IPC/CH Phase 5, indicating the most extreme food insecurity situations. However, there are key differences: **Catastrophe is a household-level classification, while Famine is an area-level classification.**

Catastrophe

Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) is classified at the household level. Households in this phase experience an extreme lack of food and an exhaustion of coping capacities – facing starvation and a significantly increased risk of acute malnutrition and death. Households may be classified as Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if the broader area is not classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). This occurs when less than 20 percent of the population experiences Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) conditions and/or when malnutrition and/or mortality levels have not yet reached the thresholds for Famine.

Famine

Famine is an area-level IPC/CH classification. For the IPC, Famine exists in areas where at least one in five households has or is most likely to have an extreme deprivation of food. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. Significant mortality, directly attributable

to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease, is occurring or will likely be occurring.

In this phase:

- The prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age reaches or exceeds 30 percent or 15 percent global acute malnutrition by mid-upper arm circumference, with evidence of rapidly worsening underlying drivers of acute malnutrition.
- Households are destitute.
- Excess mortality is prevalent, with at least two deaths per 10 000 people per day.

Famine with solid evidence

An area is classified as Famine with solid evidence when **clear and compelling data** on food insecurity (food deprivation and livelihood collapse), acute malnutrition and mortality sufficiently support the classification.

Famine with reasonable evidence

An area is classified as Famine with reasonable evidence if **two of the three thresholds** – acute food insecurity (food deprivation and livelihood collapse), acute malnutrition and mortality – have been reached, and analysts reasonably assess from the broader evidence that the third threshold is likely to have been met.

Acute food insecurity

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food deprivation of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, regardless of the cause, context or duration. The IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity scale categorizes acute food insecurity into five phases, from IPC/CH Phase 1 (No/Minimal) to IPC/CH Phase 5 (Catastrophe/Famine). Each phase has distinct implications for where and how interventions should be prioritized.

Cadre Harmonisé

The Cadre Harmonisé (CH) is the multidimensional analytical framework used by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) to analyse and identify areas and population groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon.

Coping strategies

Activities undertaken by people to secure food, income or other essential goods and services when their normal livelihoods are disrupted or when shocks or hazards affect access to basic needs.

Crisis – IPC/CH Phase 3 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

In areas classified in Phase 3, households are already unable to meet their minimum food needs and either suffer from those food deficits outright or are forced to make the choice to protect food consumption by engaging in coping strategies that will harm their future ability to access food and sustain their livelihoods. For example, they may sell significant productive assets, forgo essential healthcare, or withdraw children from school so that they can eat. As households resort to increasingly severe coping mechanisms, the typically most nutritionally vulnerable

(e.g. children and pregnant and breastfeeding women) may start to bear the consequences of food consumption gaps, resulting in high or above-average acute malnutrition levels. At this point, action is needed to ensure immediate relief and support households' ability to sustain themselves and protect families from the dilemma of making choices that will likely lead to worse outcomes in the future.

Emergency – IPC/CH Phase 4 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is a critical level of acute food insecurity in which households experience large food consumption gaps, often reflected in very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality, or can only avoid such gaps by resorting to emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. At this phase, households face critical acute food insecurity and urgent action is required to save lives and livelihoods. Without timely intervention, affected populations risk starvation and death.

Food access

Having personal or household financial means to acquire food for an adequate diet, at a level that ensures the satisfaction of other basic needs is not threatened or compromised, and that adequate food is accessible to everyone, including vulnerable individuals and groups.

Food availability

Having a quantity and quality of food sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture, supplied through domestic production or imports.

Food security

A situation in which all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Based on this definition, four food security dimensions can be identified: food availability, economic and physical access to food, food utilization and stability over time.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a set of tools and protocols aimed at enhancing food security and nutrition analysis to inform decisions and the result of a partnership of organizations at global, regional and country levels. It is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of food insecurity.

Livelihoods

The capabilities, assets, both material and social, and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being, including the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about livelihood activities.

Malnutrition

A physiological condition caused by inadequate, unbalanced or excessive consumption of macronutrients and/or micronutrients. Malnutrition includes undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, overweight and obesity, and the resulting diet-related noncommunicable diseases. .

Risk of Famine

The IPC partnership defines 'risk of Famine' as the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine (IPC Phase 5) in the projected period, when Famine is not the most likely scenario. When analysts assess that the most likely scenario would result in Famine, either Famine – solid evidence or Famine – reasonable evidence will be classified, depending on the amount and quality of evidence available. By contrast, analysts may assess that in cases where Famine is not the most likely outcome, Famine would occur in an alternative scenario that has a reasonable chance of occurrence. While Famine focuses on the most likely scenario, the 'risk-of-Famine' focuses on the worst-case scenario that has a reasonable and realistic chance of happening.

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Appendices

1. Hotspots selection process

The countries and territories included as hunger hotspots in this report are those assessed as facing a potential deterioration in acute food insecurity during the outlook period. The analysis focuses specifically on acute food insecurity, rather than less severe forms of food insecurity or malnutrition.

The selection of hotspots follows a two-step approach, combining quantitative analyses with expert qualitative assessments to identify the countries and territories at highest risk.

Quantitative analysis

The quantitative analysis systematically measures and prioritizes the expected deterioration in acute food security across different contexts through a comprehensive indicator framework. This methodology employs eight core indicators organized into two categories: current status indicators and temporal change indicators.

The current status indicators comprise:

1. The absolute number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity.
2. The prevalence of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity expressed as a percentage of the surveyed population.
3. The absolute number of people facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.
4. The prevalence of people facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity expressed as a percentage of the surveyed population.

The temporal change indicators assess deterioration or improvement in the acute food security situation by comparing the most recent available estimates or projections with estimates or projections covering a comparable period a year earlier, based on the same methodology. These indicators measure:

1. The change in the absolute number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity
2. The change in the prevalence of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity expressed as a percentage of the surveyed population.
3. The change in the absolute number of people facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.
4. The change in the prevalence of people facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity expressed as a percentage of the surveyed population.

To ensure comparability across diverse contexts, each of the eight core indicators is normalized using a distribution-based quintile method. This process ranks all low-and middle-income countries and territories with available acute food insecurity data according to each indicator's value, subsequently dividing them into five equal groups. Countries and territories are assigned normalized scores from 1 (lowest severity quintile) to 5 (highest severity quintile).

Countries and territories are pre-selected as hotspots through a dual-threshold approach.

First, any country or territory receiving a normalized score of 5 on at least one of the eight indicators is automatically pre-selected. This captures those experiencing the most severe conditions or the sharpest deterioration in any dimension of acute food insecurity. In practical terms, a score of 5 indicates that, for that specific indicator, the country or territory ranks among the worst 20 percent when compared with all other countries and territories for which data on that indicator is available in the database.

Second, countries and territories with populations estimated or projected to experience Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) are automatically included, regardless of their performance

on other indicators, given the extreme severity of their circumstances.

This methodology effectively identifies contexts where food security crises are emerging or intensifying by emphasizing both the magnitude of change and the severity of current conditions, thereby highlighting hotspots requiring urgent humanitarian intervention.

Beyond the eight core indicators used for quantitative pre-selection, the analysis systematically compiles complementary data on conflict dynamics, economic shocks, natural hazards, displacement and other aggravating factors including humanitarian access constraints, agricultural seasonality patterns, coping capacity indicators, malnutrition rates, and population displacement. These additional indicators, while not part of the normalization and ranking process, are compiled into the structured data matrix to inform the subsequent qualitative assessment process, where technical experts evaluate the pre-selected countries and territories to determine the final selection of priority hotspots.

Qualitative assessment

The qualitative assessment builds on the results of the quantitative analysis and integrates expert judgement to contextualize data and refine prioritization.

While the quantitative step seeks to compare the deterioration in acute food insecurity estimates during the latest forecast period against the same period one year earlier across all low- and middle-income countries and territories with available data, comparison is frequently constrained by:

- the absence of comparable analyses in either period.
- variations in geographical and/or population coverage.
- differences in the reference timeframes; and
- methodological differences across analyses.

As a result, quantitative analysis alone does not always permit a comprehensive identification of hotspot contexts. The qualitative component therefore represents a critical step in the selection process, ensuring a nuanced assessment through expert discussion and contextual interpretation.

The final selection of hotspot countries and territories is informed by regional consultations with technical experts, including food security specialists, conflict, climate and economic risk analysts, and emergency preparedness

officers with regional expertise. These experts assess both the quantitative rankings and the broader humanitarian and contextual situation to ensure that the selection accurately reflects conditions on the ground.

The qualitative process consists of the following steps:

Regional selection meetings

FAO and WFP analysts convene regional meetings for each of the six subregions covered by the report. During these meetings, participants discuss the quantitative results and complement them with a qualitative analysis of contextual drivers and risks, focusing on:

- assessing the feasibility of year-on-year comparisons and identifying any methodological, geographical or temporal limitations.
- analysing key drivers likely to affect acute food security, including conflict, economic instability and climate-related risks, based on internal and external sources such as:
 - *Conflict and political risk:* ACLED conflict events and fatalities, WFP Watch list and Active Early Warnings reports, INFORM Risk Index projected conflict risk;
 - *Economic risk:* WFP Watch list and Active Early Warnings economic risk indicators, IMF and World Bank headline/food inflation rate and GDP growth rate, staple food prices from FAO GIEWS FPMI Tool, agricultural production forecasts/estimates from FAO GIEWS CPFS/Country briefs.
 - *Climate risk:* WFP Watch list and Active Early Warnings climate indicators, WFP Seasonal Outlook, FAO GIEWS Earth Observation, presence of a lean season, GEOGLAM and ASAP/JRC agricultural condition indicators, and weather forecasts from the International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI), the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA);
- conducting a comparative analysis of the results of the WFP Hunger Map.
- assessing national coping capacity using the INFORM Risk Index.
- evaluating the severity of humanitarian access constraints through the ACAPS Humanitarian Access Overview index.

- examining nutrition trends, including year-on-year changes in the Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) burden and WFP Nutrition Risk Indicator results.
- analysing refugee and displacement trends using data from UNHCR, IOM DTM and UNRWA.

Each regional meeting concludes with a consensus-based list of countries and territories proposed for inclusion in the report. The rationale for inclusion or exclusion is documented in meeting notes. During the process, proposed countries and territories are categorized based on level of concern. For more details on the categorization, see Figure 1 (p.1) describing the categories of hunger hotspots and situations requiring monitoring on page one of the report.

Final Selection

The regional outcomes are reviewed in a final selection meeting by the report's core team, who compare analyses across regions and with previous editions. In cases of uncertainty or discrepancy, regional analysts or country offices are consulted to validate or refine the list. This process ensures technical consensus and strengthens the evidence base of the selection.

Risk Narrative Production

The text describing the conditions in the hotspots and in the situations requiring monitoring is prepared by technical experts, including food security, conflict, climate and economic risk analysts. Text drafted by one agency is peer reviewed by counterparts in the other, which ensures interagency consensus on the final wording. Furthermore, the text is checked through:

- a technical review by the report's core team and selected senior FAO and WFP experts to ensure technical accuracy, consistency and coherence.
- a review of critical food security terminology in collaboration with IPC Global Support Unit colleagues.

Clearance and Validation

The text of the risk narratives and the relative selection process is further validated through a process of clearance and feedback involving FAO and WFP field offices, as well as FAO and WFP at management and leadership levels.

Further information on the methodology is available upon request.

2. Acute food insecurity data sources excluding IPC/CH by country

The acute food insecurity figures presented in this report for Myanmar and the Syrian Arab Republic are derived from the HNRPs.

- For Myanmar, the acute food insecurity figures for 2025 are from pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP, as a basis for generating results for the Myanmar 2026 HNRP.
- For the Syrian Arab Republic, acute food insecurity numbers are based on WFP's CARI methodology.
- Up-to-date estimates of people in need of food security and livelihood assistance were not available for Colombia, Ethiopia and the West Bank.

For all the other countries where data are available, acute food insecurity figures are based on IPC or CH analyses.



Notes

- 1 The title of the humanitarian plan varies depending on the context and humanitarian coordination structure in each country. It may be referred to as a Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), a Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) or a Flash Appeal, among others. In addition, the structure and scope of humanitarian Clusters differ across countries, leading to a range of food security-related interventions. These may focus solely on food security or encompass broader areas such as food security and livelihoods, or food security and agriculture. Regardless of this variation, all such interventions fall within the scope of the Food Security Cluster or Sector.
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As of September 2025, El Fasher town (North Darfur) and the besieged town of Kadugli (South Kordofan) were classified in Famine (IPC Phase 5) with reasonable evidence. These conditions are expected to persist through January 2026. Conditions in the besieged town of Dilling (South Kordofan) are estimated to be similar to those in Kadugli town; however, the lack of data prevents IPC classification of this area.

In September 2025, at the peak of the lean season, an estimated 21.2 million people—45 percent of the population—faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 375 000 people in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) and 6.3 million people in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Food security conditions will improve after the harvest, leading to a decline in the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above to 19.2 million people between October 2025 and January 2026. However, in North Darfur and the Western Nuba Mountains, gains from the harvest will remain limited due to conflict and insecurity. During the post-harvest and pre-lean season (February - May 2026), acute food insecurity is projected to worsen with an estimated 19.1 million people (41 percent) expected to face IPC Phase 3 or above conditions. This apparent reduction in numbers is primarily due to the inability to classify several high-concern areas.

For more details see the full report: <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159787>

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- In September 2025, at the peak of the lean season, an estimated 21.2 million people – 45 percent of the population – faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 375 000 people in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) and 6.3 million people in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Food security conditions will improve after the harvest, leading to a decline in the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above to 19.2 million people between October 2025 and January 2026. However, in North Darfur and the Western Nuba Mountains, gains from the harvest will remain limited due to conflict and insecurity. During the post-harvest and pre-lean season (February–May 2026), acute food insecurity is projected to worsen with an estimated 19.1 million people (41 percent) expected to face IPC Phase 3 or above conditions. This apparent reduction in numbers is primarily due to the inability to classify several high-concern areas.
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Within GNAFC’s framework, FAO and WFP, together with relevant partners, have established a coordinated monitoring system for food security, livelihoods and value chains to identify and inform critical anticipatory actions.

This report is part of a series of GNAFC’s analytical products contributing to the generation and sharing of consensus- and evidence-based information for preventing and addressing food crises.

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 Bluesky

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Contact information

Office of Emergencies and Resilience
OER-Director@fao.org
fao.org/emergencies

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Rome, Italy

Analysis, Planning and Performance Division (APP)
wfpinfo@wfp.org
wfp.org

World Food Programme
Rome, Italy

GNAFC Members



An Roinn Talmhaíochta,
Bia agus Mara
Department of Agriculture,
Food and the Marine



Food and Agriculture
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